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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Constitution Art. VIII § 3, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j), and Utah 
R. App. P. 3 and Utah R. App. P. 4. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was it error for the trial court to award attorney's 
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (the bad faith statute) 
to defendants, the non-prevailing parties, based on an 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3 (the quiet title 
statute) that would define "costs" to include "attorney's fees"? 
The trial court's findings of fact as to bad faith may be reversed 
only if clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Re id v. Mutual 
of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). The trial 
court's determination that defendants' claim had merit should be 
reviewed for correctness as a matter of law. Jeschke v. Willisr 
811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also Bellon v. Malnar. 808 
P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991) . This issue was preserved at the trial 
court level in the Plaintiffs' Notice of Objections to the Proposed 
Order and Judgment. (R. at 135.) 
2. Was it error for the trial court to withhold an award 
of attorney fees from the prevailing party pursuant to the bad 
faith statute when the non-prevailing parties never had, asserted, 
or claimed a basis in law or in fact for their legal or factual 
position and nevertheless took affirmative actions to take 
advantage of the prevailing parties and to hinder and delay the 
prevailing parties' enjoyment of a clear and undisputed right? The 
trial court's findings of fact may be reversed only if clearly 
erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. 
Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). The trial court's finding 
under the bad faith statute that plaintiffs' claim was without 
merit should be reviewed for correctness as a matter of law. 
Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also 
Bellon v. Malnarr 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991). This issue was 
preserved at the trial court level in the Plaintiffs' Notice of 
Objections to the Proposed Order and Judgment. (R. at 135.) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56; Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3; Cadv v. 
Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. 
Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981); Tholen v. Sandy City. 849 
P.2d 592 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Plaintiffs appeal from a final 
judgment on the parties7 cross-motions seeking an award of 
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attorney/s fees. Defendants were awarded $484.00 against 
plaintiffs for attorney's fees (R. at 129.) Plaintiffs' request 
for attorney's fees was denied. (R. at 129.) 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiffs 
filed a complaint against the defendants seeking a court order 
quieting title to real property in plaintiffs and requiring 
defendants to pay plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's fees if any of 
the defendants asserted a meritless defense to the action. (R. at 
2, 6.) Forty-one days later, defendants filed answers, 
counterclaims for attorney's fees, and requests for Rule 11 
sanctions. (R. at 16, 21.) After briefing, but without an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a proposed ruling 
denying plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and granting 
defendants' motion for attorney's fees. (R. at 129.) Plaintiffs 
filed an objection to the proposed order and judgment and requested 
a hearing. (R. at 138, 140.) At the October 5, 1995, hearing, the 
trial court declined to alter its previous ruling but did explain 
the reasoning it used to arrive at its ruling. (R. at 142.) The 
court signed and filed the judgment, order and findings. (R. at 
155.) On December 12, 1995, plaintiffs filed a notice appealing 
the trial court's order and judgment. (R. at 160.) 
C. Statement of Facts. This case originally involved a 
boundary line dispute between plaintiffs and defendant Janice 
Miller (hereafter "Defendant Miller") and defendants Kim and Dana 
Anderson (hereafter "Defendants Anderson"). The Andersons are the 
daughter and son-in-law of Defendant Miller and acquired from 
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Defendant Miller property adjacent to plaintiffs' property. 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Miller have been neighbors and adjoining 
landowners for many years. The boundary line between their 
properties has been marked by a fence and hedge (hereafter "the 
fence") that have continually existed, unmoved, for over twenty 
years. (R at 4, 5.) This boundary line, marked by the fence, is 
slightly different than the boundary line described in historical 
deeds (which put the boundary line a few feet over onto plaintiffs' 
land). However, both plaintiffs and defendants, as well as their 
predecessors in title, have always acquiesced to and recognized the 
fence as the boundary between their properties. (R. at 4, 19.) In 
fact, Defendant Miller has executed deeds and filed subdivision 
plat maps in which she acknowledged the fence as the boundary line. 
(R. at 4, 31, 42, 46, 48.) 
In 1994, plaintiffs began subdividing parts of their 
property. (R. at 73.) At the June 15, 1994, American Fork City 
Planning Commission meeting, plaintiffs sought final plat approval 
on a subdivision which included their property adjacent to the 
fence. (R. at 64.) However, Defendant Miller appeared at that 
meeting and asserted an interest in the plaintiffs' property 
adjacent to the fence, thereby causing the city to deny approval 
for plaintiffs' subdivision and building permits. (R. at 64.) 
After the meeting, plaintiff Curtis Chipman provided Defendant 
Miller a copy of a recent newspaper article which cited Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990) , and explained the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision that a boundary line will stand under the rule of 
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boundary by acquiescence if a fence line between two pieces of 
property has existed for many years and no one has challenged its 
location. (R. at 63, 84, 85.) "Old Fences Describe Boundaries," 
The Daily Herald. 1990. 
The following month, in order to resolve the dispute, 
plaintiffs retained an attorney. In the attorney's file memo he 
states: 
I met with Jan Miller this morning for a little over 
two hours. We went over the plats. At first, her 
attitude was that she wanted $8,000.00 from Curtis 
Chipman if he wants a Quit-Claim Deed to that 
property. She says, however, that she does not 
intend to disturb the present fence line, but if he 
wants a record title to his property he is going to 
have to pay something for it. 
(R. at 62, 119.) 
The plaintiffs later retained a new attorney, the undersigned 
counsel, who sent to Defendant Miller, but not to Defendants 
Anderson, a letter which stated in relevant part: 
Curtis and Fay Chipman have asked that I represent 
them in their efforts to obtain clear title to the 
property within their fence line and along their 
boundary. I understand there have been some 
communications with you regarding this and that you 
insist on being paid for the land within their fence 
line. I have attached a case decided by the Utah 
Supreme Court of Appeals just a few weeks ago that 
clearly establishes that the Chipmans are entitled to 
the property within their fence line and they do not 
need to buy it from you. This is because the fence 
line has created a situation known as "boundary by 
acquiescence." That fence has been there as long as 
anybody can remember and has been treated as the 
boundary for decades. The Carter case that I have 
attached explains more fully why the Chipmans are 
entitled to the land within their fence line without 
payment. There are many other Utah cases that stand 
for the same proposition. If necessary the Chipmans 
will pursue their legal rights in the courts. I feel 
confident they will prevail if they are required to 
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pursue that action. However, neither they nor I wish 
to take such drastic action unless it is absolutely 
necessary. They would much prefer to resolve this 
matter through conversation. To that end, please 
give me a call at 785-5350 so we can set up an 
appointment to get this matter resolved. If you have 
an attorney, I would encourage you to make him aware 
of this situation. If the Chipmans are forced to 
litigate this matter, it is very likely the court 
would require you to pay the Chipmans' attorney's 
fees. Please respond by December 18. 1994. so we can 
get this matter resolved in as cordial a way as 
possible. I am looking forward to hearing from you. 
(R. at 61.) 
The next month, plaintiffs sent to Defendant Miller and 
Defendants Anderson another letter. This was the first letter sent 
to Defendants Anderson. (R. at 56.) In relevant part, that letter 
states: 
I am enclosing the original quit-claim deed resolving 
the boundary dispute between you and the Chipmans. 
I strongly urge you to sign the deed and deliver it 
to Mountain West Title Company, 871 South Orem 
Boulevard, Orem, Utah, no later than January 13, 
1995. I have met with you and understand your 
position in this matter. I have extensively reviewed 
legal documents, deeds, and plats relating to the 
disputed land area and I have come to the conclusion 
that it is unreasonable for you to delay signing any 
longer. I believe any arguments you may raise in 
defense to this case would be frivolous. I 
understand you may not agree with my characterization 
of the case. However, I believe the following 
documents set forth in chronological order will 
explain how I arrived at that conclusion. 
(R. at 56.) This letter identified a number of deeds which 
Defendant Miller had signed acknowledging the fence line as the 
properties7 boundary. (R. at 31, 46, 48.) The letter notified all 
defendants that they needed to respond by January 13, 1995 or 
plaintiffs would "immediately commence litigation." (R. at 53, 
56.) Defendants Anderson were named in this letter (and not the 
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first) because Defendant Miller had asserted that Defendants 
Anderson needed additional footage for their property beyond the 
fence line and would therefore not sign a quit-claim deed. (R. at 
71.) However, Defendants Anderson did not respond to the letter. 
(R. at 71.) 
Plaintiffs determined that the only way they were going to 
obtain clear title to their property was by commencing litigation. 
(R. at 71.) Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 8, 1995. On 
March 28, 1995, defendants' attorney called plaintiffs' attorney 
and requested additional time to answer the complaint. Plaintiffs' 
attorney gave defendants' attorney his first extension to file an 
answer. (R. at 40.) On April 3, 1995, defendants' attorney called 
plaintiffs' attorney and indicated Defendant Miller would sign a 
quit-claim deed if plaintiffs would remove the hedge that had 
served as part of plaintiffs' property boundary for more than five 
decades. (R. at 70.) Defendants' attorney also stated that 
Defendants Anderson did not claim an interest in property north of 
the fence line. (R. at 25, 26.) He stated he would mail 
plaintiffs' attorney a letter explaining Defendants Anderson's and 
Miller's position. (R. at 25.) On April 5, 1995, plaintiffs' 
attorney faxed to defendants' attorney a document showing 
plaintiffs' hedge was in compliance with local ordinances. (R. at 
39.) The fax cover letter stated: 
If you will confirm in writing that Dana and Kim 
Anderson do not claim an interest in property north 
of the fence line between Andersons and Chipmans, 
then I will gladly prepare an order dismissing Dana 
and Kim from the lawsuit. As to Jan Miller, please 
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answer on her behalf by close of business on 
Wednesday, April 5, 1995. 
(R. at 38, 39.) In the fax plaintiffs' attorney granted the 
defendants a second extension of time to file their answer. (R. at 
38, 39.) 
On April 7, 1995, plaintiffs' attorney faxed defendants' 
attorney another quit-claim deed because defendants' attorney said 
he did not have a suitable deed. (R. at 36, 37.) In the fax 
plaintiffs' attorney also stated, "We still need to talk about 
attorney's fees." (R. at 36, 37.) 
On April 14, 1995, nine days after the second extension 
deadline for filing an answer, Defendant Miller still had not filed 
an answer to the complaint nor had she provided plaintiffs with a 
quit-claim deed. Therefore, after discussions with defendants' 
attorney, plaintiffs' attorney faxed to defendants' attorney a note 
granting a third extension of time. The note stated as follows: 
I have not yet received the letter you mentioned or 
the signed quit-claim deed. I will need to file a 
default judgment against Jan Miller on 4/18/95. I 
will not file the default judgment against the 
Andersons based on your representation that you will 
confirm in writing that the Andersons do not assert 
an interest in Chipmans' property. 
(R. at 34, 35.) Defendants' attorney responded with a letter 
confirming that Defendants Anderson would not be asserting 
ownership interest in property north of the fence line. (R. at 
33.) However, the letter also noted that getting a quit-claim deed 
from Defendant Miller was not a "done deal." The letter stated 
Defendant Miller's attorney would "endeavor to have her sign that 
quit-claim deed to comply with your deadline." (R. at 33.) 
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On April 18, 1995, at approximately 11:00 a.m., defendants' 
attorney called plaintiffs' attorney to advise that Defendant 
Miller had signed a quit-claim deed. (R. at 69.) He also insisted 
that plaintiffs not require Defendant Miller to file an answer. 
(R. at 69.) At 2:08 p.m., and for the third time in writing, 
plaintiffs' attorney advised defendants' attorney by fax that 
Defendants Anderson did not need to file an answer and, for the 
fourth time in less than a month, plaintiffs granted Defendant 
Miller an extension of time to file her answer. (R. at 29.) 
Two and one-half hours later, at 4:34 p.m., in spite of being 
informed three times in writing that Defendants Anderson did not 
have to file an answer, Defendants Anderson filed an answer and 
affirmatively sought recovery of their attorney's fees. (R. at 
21.) Additionally, after plaintiffs had granted her four 
extensions of time, and after being told she did not yet have to 
file, Defendant Miller filed an answer and affirmatively sought 
recovery of her attorney's fees. (R. at 16.) 
Citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the trial court denied 
plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees. (R. at 129). Having 
determined that plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees was 
meritless, the trial court then awarded defendants attorney's fees 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. (R. at 129.) 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
It was error for the trial court to award attorney's fees to 
the defendants pursuant to the bad faith statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56. The defendants were not prevailing parties in the 
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underlying dispute and therefore were not entitled to attorney's 
fees under the bad faith statute. The trial court further erred in 
interpreting the quiet title statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, as 
precluding an award of attorney's fees and thereby ruling that 
plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees was without merit. The 
language of the quiet title statute, which in certain circumstances 
prohibits an award of "costs," should not have been interpreted by 
the trial court as prohibiting an award of "attorney's fees" as 
well as prohibiting "costs." In addition, there was no evidence 
presented to the trial court to suggest, much less prove, that 
plaintiffs' claim was brought or asserted in bad faith. 
It was also error for the trial court to deny plaintiffs' 
claim for attorneys' fees pursuant to the bad faith statute. 
Because plaintiffs obtained the object of their lawsuit, they were 
the prevailing parties in the underlying dispute. Furthermore, 
plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees under the bad faith 
statute because Defendant Miller's claim to plaintiffs' property 
was without merit. Plaintiffs had a clear and undisputed right to 
the use and enjoyment of their property up to the fence line. 
Additionally, Defendant Miller's claim to plaintiffs' land across 
the fence line was made in bad faith. She made her claim to 
plaintiffs' property with the intent to force plaintiffs to pay 
money for land she had repeatedly acknowledged was rightfully 
theirs and with knowledge that the assertion of her claim would 
hinder and delay the approval of plaintiffs' applied-for permits. 
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The court should include in its award the attorney's fees 
incurred by plaintiffs prior to filing suit, which were incurred as 




I. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S PEES TO 
THE DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO THE BAD FAITH STATUTE. 
In pertinent part, the bad faith statute states: "In civil 
actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense 
to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Because the defendants were 
not prevailing parties in the underlying dispute, they are not 
entitled to attorney's fees under the bad faith statute. 
Black's Law Dictionary gives an excellent statement of the 
general rule and the definition of the term "prevailing party": 
The party to a suit who successfully prosecutes the 
action or successfully defends against it, prevailing 
on the main issue, even though not necessarily to the 
extent of his original contention. . . . To be such 
does not depend upon the degree of success at 
different stages of the suit, but whether, at the end 
of the suit, or other proceeding, the party who made 
a claim against the other, has successfully 
maintained it. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 1168 (West 1990). 
In Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P. 2d 1034 (Utah 
1981), the plaintiff, Highland Construction, claimed attorney's 
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-8 (1953) (repealed by Laws 1980, 
ch. 75 § 5) , which provided attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party. Highland claimed to be the prevailing party because five 
and one-half months after filing suit the defendant, Stevenson, 
admitted that he owed Highland and voluntarily paid Highland a 
portion of the amount claimed in Highland's complaint. The Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees to Highland, 
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stating that "[i]n view of that payment after the action was 
started, Highland was 'the prevailing party7 with regard to that 
cause of action." Id. at 1037. The Highland court also stated 
that Highland was the prevailing party because: 
It should make no difference whether the plaintiff 
recovers money from the defendant during the course 
of the action by voluntary payment or whether the 
plaintiff recovers that amount by a judgment. In 
both instances the plaintiff has recovered money by 
virtue of its action. 
Id. at 1037 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, in Scatcherd v. Love, 166 F. 53 (6th Cir. 1908), 
a federal court found that a defendant could not be considered the 
successful party after he had acknowledged his liability to the 
plaintiff by paying the claim upon which he was sued, prior to 
judgment. Instead, the court concluded that the plaintiff was the 
successful party because his suit had brought about a satisfaction 
of his claim against the defendant. 
In the case now before this Court, plaintiffs filed a 
complaint in order to obtain clear title to their property. (R. at 
6.) In their answers, defendants admitted every substantive 
allegation contained in the complaint. (R. at 16, 21.) After 
answering, Defendant Miller also signed a quitclaim deed and 
Defendants Anderson provided a document admitting they had no 
interest in the property. (R. at 91.) None of the defendants 
prevailed on any claim or issue. In fact, they did not even obtain 
a dismissal of the action. They settled plaintiffs7 claim by 
Defendant Miller delivering a deed to the disputed property and 
Defendants Anderson delivering a document verifying they claimed no 
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interest in the property. Thus, after plaintiffs filed the 
complaint the plaintiffs obtained clear title to their property, 
the object of their suit. By awarding attorney's fees to the 
defendants, the trial court awarded attorney's fees to the losing 
party. 
Nonetheless, the trial court apparently reasoned that 
defendants were the prevailing party because they were successful 
on their motion for attorney's fees. (R. at 165, 166.) However, 
the court's reasoning was circular and unsound. In both essence 
and fact, the trial court found that defendants were the prevailing 
party because the court was awarding them attorney's fees, and the 
court awarded defendants attorney's fees because the court found 
they were the prevailing party. 
It is a misapplication of the bad faith statute to apply its 
penalty against a party for filing an unsuccessful motion for 
attorney's fees. If the trial court's intention was to discourage 
the filing of frivolous motions (which plaintiffs' motion was not) , 
it applied the wrong law. The court rules have clearly provided 
for relief from the filing of frivolous motions of virtue of Utah 
R. Civ. P. 11. 
A plain reading of the bad faith statute makes evident the 
conclusion that the statute requires the party seeking attorney's 
fees to prevail on some claim or issue other than its bad faith 
motion. At a minimum, before awarding attorney's fees under the 
bad faith statute, courts should require a finding that the moving 
party has obtained some substantive relief in its favor. 
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Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
determination that defendants were the prevailing party in the 
underlying dispute and its award of attorney's fees to defendants. 
A. The language of the quiet title statute, which in 
certain circumstances prohibits an award of "costs," 
should not have been interpreted by the trial court as 
prohibiting an award of "attorney's fees" as well as 
prohibiting "costs." 
The quiet title statute states: "If the defendant in . . . 
[a quiet title] action disclaims in his answer any interest or 
estate in the property, or suffers judgment to be taken against him 
without answer, the plaintiff cannot recover costs." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-40-3 (emphasis added). The trial court apparently 
misinterpreted "costs" to include attorney's fees. The quiet title 
statute does not prohibit attorney's fees. 
The long-settled distinction between costs and attorney's 
fees is aptly made in the definition of "costs" found in Black's 
Law Dictionary: "Generally, 'costs' do not include attorney fees 
unless such fees are by a statute denominated costs or are by 
statute allowed to be recovered as costs in the case, Black's Law 
Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 346 (West 1990). 
It is well-settled in Utah that courts do not read "costs" 
to include attorney's fees. See, e.g., Tholen v. Sandy City. 849 
P.2d 592 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); World Peace Movement of America v. 
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253 (Utah 1994); Cluff v. Culmer. 
556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976). Thus, the trial court's interpretation 
of the quiet title statute as prohibiting awards of attorney's fees 
was clearly incorrect. 
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B. No evidence was presented to the trial court to 
suggest, much less prove, that plaintiffs' claim was 
brought or asserted in bad faith 
In the present case, the trial court found that plaintiffs' 
claim for attorney's fees under the bad faith statute was not 
asserted in good faith. (R. at 170.) Apparently, the trial court 
was of the opinion that the quiet title statute's prohibition of 
awarding costs also prohibited an award of attorney's fees, and 
therefore any claim brought for attorney's fees under the quiet 
title statute was, by definition, made in bad faith. 
As evidenced by the arguments presented herein, plaintiffs 
not only had sufficient legal and factual bases for their claim for 
attorney's fees but also had ample case and treatise authority in 
support of that claim. The arguments presented in Section I.A, 
support plaintiffs' position that a plain reading of the quiet 
title statute would not prohibit their claim for attorney's fees. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs had no reason whatsoever to suspect that 
their claim for attorney's fees pursuant to the bad faith statute 
was in any way precluded by the quiet title statute. Plaintiffs 
brought their claim with an honest belief it was appropriate and 
well-founded in law and fact, and without any intent to hinder, 
delay, defraud or take advantage of defendants, and defendants 
presented absolutely no evidence to the contrary. Other than the 
actual cross-motion for attorney's fees filed by the Plaintiffs, 
there is no evidence to marshall that shows the Plaintiffs were 
acting in bad faith. Therefore, the decision of the trial court 
should be reversed. 
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II. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 
FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO THE BAD FAITH STATUTE. 
In pertinent part, the bad faith statute states: "In civil 
actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense 
to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
A. Because plaintiffs obtained the object of their 
lawsuit, they were the prevailing party in the 
underlying dispute. 
The general rule and definition of the term "prevailing 
party" have been discussed previously in Section I. In the case 
now before this Court, plaintiffs filed a complaint in order to 
obtain clear title to their property from claims asserted by the 
defendants. After they filed the complaint, plaintiffs obtained 
the necessary quit-claim deed from Defendant Miller and 
acknowledgment from Defendants Anderson of their lack of interest 
in the property. Accordingly, plaintiffs obtained the object of 
their lawsuit. Plaintiffs were the prevailing party because their 
suit brought about a satisfaction of their claim against the 
defendants. See Scatcherd v. Love, 166 F. 53, 56 (6th Cir. 1908). 
Thus, "at the end of the suit" plaintiffs were "the party who made 
a claim against the other, [and who] . . . successfully maintained 
it." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 1168 (West 1990). See 
also Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981). 
At the October 5, 1995, hearing the trial judge stated, 
". . . I wouldn't award attorney fees to you [plaintiffs] as a 
prevailing party because you didn't have to fight for it [the 
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object of plaintiffs' lawsuit] very hard, and that is what the 
statute says." (R. at 168.) The trial court apparently ruled 
that, based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the plaintiffs didn't 
prevail in the underlying dispute because plaintiffs obtained from 
defendants the object of their suit shortly after filing their 
complaint and prior to any rulings from the court. The trial court 
had no basis for this ruling. The prevailing party is the party 
which wins the object of its suit, not the party who fought the 
hardest. It the trial court's concern was with awarding attorney's 
fees to a party who didn't have to fight much in order to prevail 
(although that concern was completely unfounded in this case), that 
concern is adequately addressed by the discretion granted to the 
trial court to set the amount of attorney's fees it awards under 
the bad faith statute. 
Plaintiffs recognize that before a court awards attorney's 
fees under the bad faith statute it should require a finding that 
the moving party has obtained some substantial relief in its favor, 
whether that be a favorable verdict, a default judgment, a 
dismissal, or a beneficial settlement. In the present case, 
plaintiffs obtained a beneficial settlement and were therefore the 
prevailing party. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling denying 
plaintiffs an award of attorney's fees should be reversed. 
B. Defendant Miller's claim to plaintiffs' land across the 
fence line was made in bad faith. She made that claim 
with the intent to force plaintiffs to pay money for 
land she had repeatedly acknowledged was rightfully 
theirs and with knowledge that the assertion of her 
claim would hinder and delay the approval of 
plaintiffs/ applied-for permits. 
18 
In Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court defined good faith as having (1) an honest belief in 
the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take, 
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or 
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will, hinder, 
delay or defraud others. Jd. at 151. To establish lack of good 
faith, a party must prove that one or more of these factors is 
lacking. Sparkman and McLean Co. v. Derber. 481 P.2d 585 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1971). 
In the present case, at least two of these factors — and 
most likely all three — were lacking in the actions of Defendant 
Miller. Defendant Miller acted with intent to take unconscionable 
advantage of plaintiffs by forcing them to pay money for land that 
she acknowledged was rightfully theirs. (R. at 62, 64, 119.) When 
Defendant Miller intentionally prevented plaintiffs from obtaining 
a building permit, thereby interfering with plaintiffs' right to 
build upon their land, she also acted with knowledge of the fact 
that the activities she was undertaking would "hinder, delay or 
defraud" plaintiffs. (R. at 64.) Defendant Miller even verbally 
threatened plaintiffs that she would prevent them from selling 
their property. She told Plaintiff Fay Chipman that if plaintiffs 
didn't pay her $12,000.00 for the land, she would "see that [they 
would] never sell a bit of that ground." (Affidavit of Fay 
Chipman, R. at 83, 85.) Defendant Miller used the fence as the 
boundary when it was to her advantage, such as when she was 
subdividing and deeding property. When it was to her advantage to 
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not use the fence as the boundary line, as when she attempted to 
coerce money from plaintiffs, Defendant Miller claimed ownership of 
property beyond the fence. 
Even after plaintiffs, their developer consultant, and two 
different attorneys explained the facts and the law to Defendant 
Miller, she refused to act reasonably. Defendant Miller's actions 
have been characterized as "self-induced myopia" (see R. Gerard 
Lutz, Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions. 1984 Utah L. 
Rev. 593, 607) and confirm that Defendant Miller lacked an honest 
belief in the appropriateness of her actions. By requiring 
plaintiffs to file a lawsuit before she would agree to convey the 
quit-claim deed, Defendant Miller was "stubbornly litigious." See 
American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 486 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1971). The 
actions taken by Defendant Miller were intended "to harass the 
plaintiffs and force the plaintiffs to expend money on counsel." 
Lutz, supra. at 601 n.85. 
The only possible reason for Defendant Miller's myopia, 
obduracy, and stubbornly litigious actions were to unconscionably 
harass the plaintiffs into paying her money. Her claim of interest 
in plaintiffs7 property was therefore asserted and maintained in 
bad faith, and the trial court's award of attorney fees to 
defendants should be reversed. 
C. Plaintiffs had a clear and undisputed right to the use 
and enjoyment of their property up to the fence line, 
and defendants' claim to plaintiffs' property was 
therefore without merit. 
A claim is without merit if it is "frivolous" or "of little 
weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Jeschke, 811 
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P.2d at 203; Cadv v, Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). A 
claim having no basis in law or fact is without merit, but is 
nevertheless in good faith so long as there is an honest belief 
that it is appropriate and so long as there is no intent to hinder, 
delay, defraud or take advantage of another. Cadv, 671 P.2d at 
151. 
Plaintiffs had a clear right, under the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence, to the use and enjoyment of their property up to 
the fence line. From the very outset of this dispute, no one has 
claimed that the fence and hedge line had not continuously existed, 
unmoved, for over twenty years. No one has disputed that 
plaintiffs, defendants, and their predecessors in interest 
recognized the same fence and hedge line as the boundary between 
the properties. In fact, in her answer Defendant Miller admitted 
every substantive allegation contained in the complaint. She 
stated that "she had acquiesced in and agreed with every request 
made by plaintiffs in their First Cause of Action and only disputes 
the claim of the attorney fees." (R. at 19.) Thus, even the 
defendants eventually admitted that their assertion of interest in 
plaintiffs' property was without any basis in law or fact — that 
it was without merit. 
D. There are important policy reasons supporting 
plaintiffs' argument that the right to 
attorney's fees arising from the bad faith 
statute should not be superseded by the quiet 
title statute's prohibition of an award of 
costs. 
There are two ways a trial court's docket can be clogged with 
frivolous litigation. In the first scenario, Party A takes a 
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completely unreasonable position, obstinately sticks by that 
position regardless of the facts or the law, and then files a 
frivolous lawsuit. The bad faith statute clearly provides a remedy, 
to the defendant who has been unnecessarily dragged into court by 
Party A. In the second scenario, Party B takes and maintains a 
completely unreasonable position not supported by any laws or 
facts, thereby causing damage to Party A. In order to obtain 
relief from Party B's frivolous claims or assertions, Party A may 
eventually be left with no option but to resort to the courts. 
If the trial court's interpretation of the bad faith statute 
in the present case is affirmed, the statute would not provide a 
remedy for Party A, the aggrieved Plaintiff, in the second 
scenario. The statute would become a one-edged sword, punishing 
"stubbornly litigious" plaintiffs and allowing "stubbornly 
litigious" defendants to act with impunity. Such an interpretation 
of the bad faith statute would result in reimbursement to a 
defendant for the costs of preparing an unnecessary answer but 
would withhold reimbursement from a plaintiff for the costs of 
preparing an unnecessary complaint. Under the trial court's 
interpretation, no matter how obstinate or malicious a defendant's 
pre-litigation conduct, the bad faith statute would provide no 
relief for the injured plaintiff who is forced to hire an attorney, 
prepare a complaint, and go to court to reclaim property that is 
indisputably his. 
Equity should not and does not allow such disparate treatment 
of parties. In fact, Utah courts have recognized that an award of 
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attorney's fees can and should be used to curb the actions of 
obstinate defendants who require plaintiffs to resort to the courts 
unnecessarily. In Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), the court noted: 
[T]here are exceptions to the general rule that 
attorney's fees may only be awarded pursuant to 
contract or statute. In Stewart v. Public Service 
Comm'n. 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "in the absence of a 
statutory or contractual authorization, a court has 
inherent equitable power to award reasonable 
attorney's fees when it deems appropriate in the 
interest of justice and equity." Courts have used 
the inherent power in various categories of cases. 
For example, courts have used their equitable power 
to award attorney's fees where a party has acted "'in 
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
reasons.'" Id. at 782 (quoting James W. Moore, 
Moore's Federal Practice, Section 54.77 (2d Ed. 
1972)) . 
In Jensen, the plaintiff was "required to finance legal fees to 
compel [the defendant] to fulfill his statutory obligations and 
duties" and "had little choice in bringing this matter before the 
Court . . . ." Jensen, 892 P.2d at 1058. Therefore, the court 
determined, "we believe that under these circumstances, equity 
demands the award of attorney's fees." Id. at 1059. Because the 
plaintiff in that case had a clearly defined right to the relief 
sought and the defendant obstinately refused to permit her 
enjoyment of that right, the court awarded plaintiff attorney's 
fees. 
Other courts similarly award attorney's fees against 
defendants who force plaintiffs to file suit in order to enjoy 
clearly defined rights. In Harkeen v. Adams, 377 A.2d 617 (N.H. 
1977), the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined that, "where an 
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individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a 
clearly defined and established right, which should have been 
freely enjoyed without such intervention," the individual should be 
awarded his attorney's fees. Id. at 619; see also Andrews v. 
District of Columbia, 443 A.2d 566, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert, 
denied. 459 U.S. 909 (1982); Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of 
Richmond, 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 1965), vacated on other 
grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965). These courts reason that a party 
forced to retain an attorney and pay the attorney's fees to 
establish an airtight claim ends up suffering substantial, 
unnecessary monetary damages. See Upson v. Board of Trustees, 474 
A.2d 582 (N.H. 1984) (recognizing that in cases where there is a 
clearly established right which should have been enjoyed without 
judicial intervention, an award of attorney's fees is proper when 
a person is forced by another in bad faith to litigate to establish 
that right); see also Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and 
the Great Society, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 792 (1966). 
Courts have also held that an award of attorney's fees is 
warranted where a plaintiff was forced to litigate to regain 
possession of property that had been converted by the defendant. 
See Gladstone v. Hillel, 250 Cal. Rptr. 372, 380-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988); Motor Ins. Co. v. Singleton. 677 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1984); and Fulks v. Fulks. 121 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio 1953). See 
also 18 Am. Jur.2d Conversion § 120. When a party intentionally 
intrudes on the rights of another, and forces the other party to 
sue, the party who caused the litigation should pay the other's 
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attorney's fees. See Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond. 345 F.2d 
310, 321 (4th Cir. 1965) (holding that attorney's fees should be 
awarded "when it is found that the bringing of an action should 
have been unnecessary and was compelled by the [defendant's] 
unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy"). 
For decades, plaintiffs in the instant case had a clearly 
defined and established right to the use and enjoyment of the 
property north of the fence line. (R. at 4, 5.) Plaintiffs should 
not be precluded from recovering their attorney's fees simply 
because defendants' conduct required plaintiffs to initiate 
litigation to quiet title rather than waiting for defendants to sue 
them. It was inequitable for defendants to force plaintiffs to 
litigate for a right to which they were already entitled and should 
have enjoyed without interference. Requiring plaintiffs to also 
bear the costs of judicially securing that right from meritless and 
bad faith claims would only compound that inequity. 
III. PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE REIMBURSED FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED 
PRIOR TO FILING SUIT, INCURRED AS A RESULT OF DEFENDANTS' 
BAD FAITH ASSERTION AND MAINTENANCE OF A MERITLESS CLAIM. 
The issue of reimbursement for pre-litigation attorney's fees 
based on the bad faith statute has not been previously determined 
in Utah. However, there is significant precedent and authority in 
other jurisdictions supporting such an award. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated that "it is clear" that bad faith conduct 
sufficient to serve as the basis for an award of attorney's fees 
can as readily "be found . . . in the actions which led to the 
lawsuit" as in "the conduct of the litigation" itself. Hall v. 
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Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13 (1973). See also Roadway Express Inc. v. 
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980); Schlank v. Williams, 572 A.2d 101, 
111 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990) ("assum[ing] . . . that on a proper 
showing appellant would have been entitled to pre-litigation 
attorney's fees); 31 A.L.R. Fed. 833, Award of Counsel Fees to 
Prevailing Party Based on Adversary's Bad Faith, Obduracy, or Other 
Misconduct: and 49 A.L.R. 4th 825, Attorney's Fees; Obduracy, As 
Basis For State Court Award. 
Furthermore, numerous other state courts have held that an 
award of attorney's fees is warranted by "bad faith" or "obduracy" 
during the pre-litigation time period. The courts' analyses in 
these cases focused on state statutes which are similar to Utah's 
bad faith statute in their failure to explicitly provide for or 
restrict a court's authority to grant an award of attorney's fees 
for pre-litigation bad faith conduct. See, e.g., Harkeen v. Adams, 
377 A.2d 617 (N.H. 1977); Griffin v. New Hampshire Dept. of 
Employment Security, 370 A.2d 278 (N.H. 1977). 
This Court should follow the well-established line of 
reasoning used by other jurisdictions and award pre-litigation 
attorney's fees to parties when the bad faith conduct of another 
forces them to unnecessarily fight for a clearly established right, 
eventually necessitating the filing of an unnecessary lawsuit. 
This Court should also award pre-litigation attorney's fees in 
order to discourage pre-litigation bad faith conduct. Because bad 
faith conduct both before and during litigation results in 
frivolous lawsuits clogging the legal system and innocent parties 
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being forced to spend money protecting rights that should never 
have been the subject of litigation, attorney's fees for pre-
litigation bad faith actions should be recoverable by the 
prevailing party. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision constituted error in awarding 
attorney's fees to the defendants because defendants were not the 
prevailing party in the underlying dispute and are therefore not 
entitled to attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, the 
bad faith statute. 
The trial court also erred in denying plaintiffs' claim for 
attorney's fees by misinterpreting Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the 
quiet title statute, and thereby determining that plaintiffs' 
request for attorney's fees was without merit. The trial court 
incorrectly ruled that this statute's prohibition against an award 
of "costs" also prohibits an award of "attorney's fees." The quiet 
title statute does not preclude an award of attorney's fees. 
The trial court further committed error in denying an award 
of attorney's fees to plaintiffs pursuant to the bad faith statute. 
First, the trial court erred in failing to award attorney's fees to 
plaintiffs given that plaintiffs were the prevailing party in the 
underlying dispute. Second, because Defendant Miller's claim to 
plaintiffs' property was meritless due to plaintiffs' clear and 
undisputed right to the property, plaintiffs have a right to an 
award of attorney's fees under the bad faith statute. Third, 
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plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees because Defendant 
Miller's claim to the plaintiffs' property was made in bad faith. 
She asserted that claim with the intent to hinder and delay 
plaintiffs' enjoyment of an undisputed right and to attempt to 
force them to pay money to enjoy that right. 
Finally, this Court should adopt the practice of other 
jurisdictions of allowing an award of pre-litigation attorney's 
fees incurred by one party as a result of another party's bad faith 
conduct. Given defendants' bad faith actions which necessitated 
the filing of plaintiffs' complaint, this Court should accordingly 
award plaintiffs reimbursement for all attorney's fees incurred in 
this matter. 
For these reasons, plaintiffs respectfully request that this 
Court reverse the order of the trial court, thereby denying 
attorney's fees to the defendants and awarding attorney's fees to 
the plaintiffs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *r day of Yu^ 
, 1996. 
GORDON DUVAL 
Attorney for Appellants 
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477 JUDICIAL CODE 78-27a-2 
public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover 
from a ski operator for injuries resulting from those inherent 
risks. 1979 
78-27-52. Inherent risks of skiing — Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or 
conditions which are an integral part of the sports of 
skiing, snowboarding, and ski jumping, including, but not 
limited to: changing weather conditions, variations or 
steepness in terrain; snow or ice conditions; surface or 
subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth, 
rocks, stumps, impact with lift towers and other struc-
tures and their components; collisions with other skiers; 
and a skier's failure to ski or jump within the skier's own 
ability. 
(2) "Injury" means any personal injury or property 
damage or loss. 
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for 
the purpose of engaging in the sport of skiing, nordic, 
freestyle, or other types of ski jumping, and 
snowboarding. 
(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area 
operator to be used for skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other 
type of ski jumping, and snowboarding. 
(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and their 
agents, officers, employees or representatives, who oper-
ate a ski area. 1993 
78-27-53. Inherent risks of skiing — Bar against claim 
or recovery from operator for injury from 
risks inherent in sport. 
Notwithstanding anything in Sections 78-27-37 through 
78-27-43 to the contrary, no skier may make any claim 
against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury 
Resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing. 1986 
78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards list-
ing inherent risks and limitations on liability. 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more 
prominent locations within each ski area which shall include 
a list of the inherent risks of skiing, and the limitations on 
liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act. 1979 
?8-27-55. Repealed . 1980 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where act ion or 
defense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court sha!} award reasonable attor-
ney's fees to a prpvqilin^ party if the court determines that the 
action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited 
fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecunios-
ity in the action before the court; or 
(bj the court enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
1988 
78-27-56,5. Attorney's fees — Beciprocal rights to re' 
cover attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party 
that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, 
Written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 
1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 1986 
78-27-57. Attorney's fees a w a r d e d to state funded 
a g e n c y in ac t ion against state or subdivis ion 
— Forfeit of appropriated monies . 
Any agency or organization receiving state funds which, as 
a result of its suing the state, or political subdivision thereof, 
receives attorney's fees and costs as all or part of a settlement 
or award, shall forfeit to the General Fund, from its appropri-
ated monies, an amount equal to the attorney's fees received. 
1981 
78-27-58. Service of judicial process by persons other 
than law enforcement officers. 
Persons who are not peace officers, constables, sheriffs, or 
lawfully appointed deputies of such officers or authorized state 
investigators may not serve any forms of civil or criminal 
process other than complaints, summonses, and subpoenas. 
1993 
78-27-59. Immunity for transient shelters. 
(1) As used in this section, "transient shelter" means any 
person which provides shelter, food, clothing, or other prod-
ucts or services without consideration to indigent persons. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), all transient 
shelters, owners, operators, and employees of transient shel-
ters, and persons who contribute products or services to 
transient shelters, are immune from suit for damages or 
injuries arising out of or related to the damaged or injured 
person's use of the products or services provided by the 
transient shelter. 
(3) This section does not prohibit an action against a person 
for damages or injury intentionally caused by that person or 
resulting from his gross negligence. 1986 
78-27-60. Limited immunity for archi tects and engi-
neers inspect ing earthquake damage. 
( D A professional engineer licensed under Title 58, Chapter 
22, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors Licensing Act, 
or an architect licensed under Title 58, Chapter 3, Architects 
Licensing Act, who provides structural inspection services at 
the scene of a declared national, state, or local emergency 
caused by a major earthquake is not liable for any personal 
injury, wrongful death, or property damage caused by the good 
faith inspection for structural integrity or nonstructural ele-
ments affecting health and safety of a structure used for 
human habitation or owned by a public entity if the inspection 
is performed: 
(a) voluntarily, without compensation or the expecta-
tion of compensation; 
(b) at the request of a public official or city or county 
building inspector acting in an official capacity; and 
(c) within 30 days of the earthquake. 
(2) The immunity provided for in Subsection (1) does not 
apply to gross negligence or willful misconduct. 1992 
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Legislative findings — Purpose. 
Definitions. 
Litigation expense award authorized in actions 
by state. 
Litigation expense award authorized in appeals 
from administrative decisions. 
Payment of expenses awarded — Statement re-
quired in agency's budget. 
78-27a-l. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Small 
Business Equal Access to Justice Act." 1983 
78-27a-2. Legis lat ive findings — Purpose . 
The Legislature finds that small businesses may be deterred 
from seeking review of or defending against substantially 
78-39-48 JUDICIAL CODE 514 
in common for the protection, confirmation or perfecting of the 
title, or setting the boundaries, or making a survey or surveys 
of the estate partitioned, the court shall allow to the parties to 
the action who have paid the expenses of such litigation or 
other proceedings all the expenses necessarily incurred 
therein, including attorneys' fees, which shall have accrued to 
the common benefit of the other tenants in common, with 
interest thereon from the date of making such expenditures, 
and the same must be pleaded and allowed by the court and 
included in the final judgment, and shall be a lien upon the 
share of each tenant, in proportion to his interest, and shall be 
enforced in the same manner as taxable costs of partition are 
taxed and collected. 1953 
78-39-48. Abstract of tit le, cost of, inspect ion. 
If it appears to the court tha t it was necessary to have made 
an abstract of the title to the property to be partitioned and 
such abstract has been procured by the plaintiff, or if the 
plaintiff has failed to have the same made before the com-
mencement of the action and any one of the defendants shall 
have such abstract afterwards made, the cost of the abstract, 
with interest thereon from the time the same is subject to the 
inspection of the respective parties to the action, must be 
allowed and taxed. Whenever such abstract is procured by the 
plaintiff before the commencement of the action he must file 
with his complaint a notice tha t an abstract of the title has 
been made and is subject to the inspection and use of all the 
parties to the action, designating therein where the abstract 
will be kept for inspection. But if the plaintiff has failed to 
procure such abstract before commencing the action, and any 
defendant shall procure the same to be made, he shall, as soon 
as he has directed it to be made, file a notice thereof in the 
action with the clerk of the court, stating who is making the 
same and where it will be kept when finished. The court, or the 
judge thereof, may direct, from time to time during the 
progress of the action, who shall have custody of the abstract. 
1953 
78-39-49. Interest on advances to be allowed. 
Whenever during the progress of the action for partition any 
disbursement shall have been made, under the direction of the 
court or the judge thereof, by a party thereto, interest must be 




78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property — 
Authorized. 
78-40-2. Lis pendens. 
78-40-3. Disclaimer or default by defendant — Costs. 
78-40-4. Termination of title pending action — Judgment 
— Damages. 
78-40-5. Setoff or counterclaim for improvements made. 
78-40-6. Right of entry pending action for purposes of 
action. 
78-40-7. Order therefor — Liability for injuries. 
78-40-8. Mortgage not deemed a conveyance — Foreclo-
sure necessary. 
78-40-9. Alienation pending action not to prejudice recov-
ery. 
78-40-10. Actions respecting mining claims — Proof of 
customs and usage admissible. 
78-40-11. Temporary injunction in actions involving title to 
mining claims. 
78-40-12. Service of summons and conclusiveness of judg-
ment. 
Section 
78-40-13. Judgment on default — Court must require evi-
dence — Conclusiveness of judgment. 
78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property 
— Authorized. 
An action may be brought by any person against another 
who claims an estate or interest in real property or an interest 
or claim to personal property adverse to him, for the purpose 
of determining such adverse claim. 1953 
78-40-2. Lis pendens . 
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession 
of, real property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint 
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time of filing his 
answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at 
any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the 
county in which the property or some part thereof is situated 
a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of 
the parties, the object of the action or defense, and a descrip-
tion of the property in tha t county affected thereby. From the 
time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser or 
encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to 
have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and 
only of its pendency against parties designated by their real 
names. 1953 
78-40-3. Disc la imer or default by defendant - ^ Costs . j 
If the defendant in such action disclaims in his answer any 
interest or estate in the property, or suffers judgment to be 
taken against him without answer, the plaintiff cannot recover 
jEbsts^ 1953 
78-40-4. Terminat ion of t i t le p e n d i n g act ion — Judg-
ment — Damages . 
If the plaintiff shows a right to recover at the time the action 
was commenced, but it appears tha t his right has terminated 
during the pendency cf the action, the verdict and judgment 
must be according to the fact, and the plaintiff may recover 
damages for withholding the property. 1953 
78-40-5. Setoff or counterc la im for improvements 
made . 
When damages are claimed for withholding the property 
recovered, upon which permanent improvements have been 
made by a defendant, or those under whom he claims, holding 
under color of title adversely to the claims of the plaintiff, in 
good faith, the value of such improvements, except improve-
ments made upon mining property, must be allowed as a setoff 
or counterclaim against such damages. 1953 
78-4G-6. Right of entry p e n d i n g act ion for purposes of 
action. 
The court in which an action is pending for the recovery of 
real property, or for damages for an injury thereto, or to quiet 
title or to determine adverse claims thereto, or a judge of such 
court, may, on motion, upon notice by either party, for good 
cause shown, grant an order allowing to such party the right 
to enter upon the property and make survey and measure-
ment thereof, and of any tunnels, shafts or drifts thereon for 
the purpose of the action, even though entry for such purpose 
has to be made through other lands belonging to parties to the 
action. 1953 
78-40-7. Order therefor — Liabil i ty for injuries. 
The order must describe the property, and a copy thereof 
must be served on the owner or occupant, and thereupon such 
party may enter upon the property with necessary surveyors 
and assistants, and may make such survey and measurement; 
but if any unnecessary injury is done to the property, he is 
liable therefor. 1953 
2 
JUNE 15, 1994 *» s 
H"r*n* REGULAR SESSION 
The American Fork City Planning,Commi|^cMiyfe^i|Lg*ra| raxa OflkjJune 
15, 1994, at 7:00 p.m. in the American Fork cigy^Hal.1 Jm^T^gye in 
attendance include Olani Durrant, John McKinney, Kent Walker, 
Michael Georgeson, Juel Belmont, Howard Denney, Rod Despain, James 
Hansen, *Richard Colborn, Jan Miller, Mr. and Mrs. Curtis Chipman, 
Reed Elm, Stephen Sowby, Wayne Patterson, Bill Arbus, Daniel 
Copper, Todd McCabe, Michael Menlove, and 13 citizens. Not in 
attendance were Patrick Fleming and J.H. Hadfield, who were 
excused. Terilyn Nelson took the first portion of the minutes. 
ACTION ON THE HANSEN-SYKES ADDITION ANNEXATION AT 755 WEST 700 
NORTH CONSISTING OF 3.107 ACRES TO BE ZONED Rl-15.000 
James Hansen, representing his father noted the point of the 
differences in the numbers of acres on the agenda • and the 
annexation application. The reason for this was on the 
recommendation given a couple of months ago to get additional 
property for annexation. Howard Denney pointed out a problem of 
.17" difference between the Carson property and the Hansen-Sykes 
addition that would need to be worked out. John McKinney moved to 
approve and recommend the Hansen/Sykes Annexation and zoning of Rl-
15,000 to the City Council. Michael Georgeson seconded the motion. 
It was noted that it was the first annexation to the City of Rl-
15,000. All were in favor. 
ACTION ON THE FINAL PLAT OF CURTIS CHIPMAN PLAT A SUBDIVISION AT 
205 WEST 1120 NORTH 
The problem brought to the Planning Commission was the dispute 
between the property lines of Jan Miller to the south and the 
Chipmans. There was a 5 foot discrepancy in which the Chipmans 
were claiming 5 feet that Ms. Miller said was hers. The Commission 
pointed out that the 
and that they could not talce any" adtion untTT"~the problem was 
settled between the property owners. Mrs. Chipman said that a 
city official told her that the fence line was the property line, 
but she didn't know the name of the city official. It was pointed 
out that ten years ago, it was the fence line that was law, then it 
changed to yard by yard. It was suggested that both Ms. Miller and 
the Chipmans were paying taxes on the piece of property. Olani 
The two parties were told that they would have to 
It was decided that Ms. Miller would 
not get occupancy and the Chipmans would not get a building permit 
until the problem was solved. 
ACTION ON THE BALLANTYNE ANNEXATION CONSISTING OF .40 ACRES AT 420 
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HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Gordon Duval, Bar No. 6532 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Telephone (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile (801) 785-0853 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH 
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON, 
and KIM ANBERSON. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF NOALL T. 
WOOTTON 
Civil No. 950400145 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in Utah. I 
represented Curtis and Fay Chipman in a property boundary dispute 
with Jan Miller. I dictated and prepared the attached memo that 
described my conversation with Jan Miller on July 29, 1994. That 
memo correctly reflects my conversation with Jan at that time. 
FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this /fj% daY o f M aY' 1995. 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Brisc-pldg-AchipnenVaffidavit 
4-


























MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
1995. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this A ay of May, 
fnisc-pldg- Achip«an\af f idavi t 
iTARY SIGNATURE/ ' O 
RESIDING AT UTAH COUNTY 
\$*&rM OREM, UTAH 84057 
y





Noall T. Wootton 
July 29, 1994 
Subject: Curtis Chipman 
I met with Jan Miller this morning for a little over two 
hours. We went over the plats- At first, her attitude was that 
she wanted $8,000 from Curtis Chipman if he wants a Quit-Claim 
Deed to that property. She says, however, that she does not 
intend to disturb the present fenceline, but if he wants a record 
title to his property he is going to have to pay something for 
it. She said $8,000 is not a magical figure, but one she 
calculated because she had to pay $2,000 for about 200 feet of 
property along 150 West that Taylor demanded and figured this 
Chipman property was about 4 times that long. She did say that 
she would settle for $4,000, and she definitely does not want to 
go to court unless it is necessary. 
On the Evans and Elms properties, she was at first adamant 
that she would not sell any property to them under any 
circumstances. Her reasoning was that the property in issue was 
accepted into the Miller Hilltop Subdivision plat by the City, 
and she does not want to have to go to the costs and 
inconvenience of amending that plat. I asked her if she would be 
willing to give them title to that property if they were willing 
to take care of getting her plat amended to take it out of there 
and if they would, in addition, put up a decorative fence of some 
kind. She said that if her son-in-law, Dana Anderson, and her 
daughter, Kim, were willing to do that, she will do it also. 
Jan is going to talk to Dana and get back with me. I told 
her that as soon as she had done that, I would bring my clients 
in and would review everything and get back to her. Her position 
is that the lot 204 and lot 214 that Evans and Elms respectively 
own were never included in the plat of their property, so they 
never owned anything south of that down to the fence. I need to 
get a copy of that subdivision plat to see whether they bought 
the property by metes and bounds or whether they bought it by lot 
number. I also need to find out by them whether they knew that 
their platted lot number did not extend down to the fence. She 
tells me that she was privy to a conversation that they had with 
somebody (I think she mentioned the Mayor) wherein they 
acknowledged that they knew they didn't own that property. 
I should wait to hear from her before proceeding further. 
Qtt&rd cut U 2* -
HAH:DING & A S S O C I A T E S , P.C. 
A T T O W N C Y 3 AT LAW 
HO S O U T H M A I N 3 T * < C T 
PLSA3AXT OROVB, UTAH 8 4 0 6 2 
r c i c P N O N C taon 7 e s - « 3 a o 
• A Y M M A M O I N O . j » / T A C S I M I L C (son T a s - o e a a 
JAMIS *'UCHt>»" HAN9CN 
OOMOON OUVAC 
MANSHAUL S. WITT 
MA«C H. ICAUCMCMIN 
December 8, 1994 
Janice Miller 
P.O. BOX 784 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Re: Ownership of Land Along the Chipman Fenceline 
Dear Ms. Miller: 
Curtis and Faye Chipman have asked that I represent them in their 
efforts to obtain clear title to the property within their fenceline and 
along their boundary. I understand there have been some communications 
with you regarding this and that you insist on being paid for the land 
within their fenceline. I have attached a case decided by the Utah Court 
of Appeals just a few weeks ago that clearly establishes that the Chipmans 
are entitled to the property within their fenceline and they do not need 
to buy it from you. This is because the fenceline has created a situatioa 
known as "boundary by acquiescence.If That fence has been there as long as 
anybody can remember and has been treated as the boundary for decades* 
The Carter case that I have attached explains more fully why the Chipmans 
are entitled to the land within their fenceline without payment. There 
are many other Utah cases that stand for the same proposition. 
If necessary the Chipmans will pursue their legal rights in the 
courts.. I feel confident they will prevail if they are required to pursue 
that action. However, neither they nor I wish to take such drastic action 
unless it is absolutely necessary. They would much prefer to resolve this 
matter through conversation. To that end, please give me a call at 785-
5350 so we can set up an appointment to get this matter resolved. If you 
have an attorney, I would encourage you to make him aware of this 
situation. If the Chipmans are forced to litigate this matter, it is very 
likely the court would require you to pay the Chipmans' attorney's fees. 
Please respond by December 18, 1994, so we can get this matter 
resolved in as cordial a way as possible. I am looking forward to hearing 
from you. 
Sincerely, 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
GORDON DUVAL 
Attorney at Law 
3 0 e WC3T MAIN STWCCT 
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A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
MO S O U T H M A I N 3 T » C C T 
PLBASA.TT OHOVB, XJTAS 3 4 0 6 2 
^y M H A W I N G , J * 
^I^CS * * U C K l « ' H A N S C N 
ONOON OUVAU 
i l tSHAUU 3 WITT 
jtAC * 9 C A U C H C M I N 
T C L t P H O N C ( S O U 7 8 8 - 5 3 9 0 
r A C S l M l U C ( S O U 7 8 3 - 0 « 5 3 A M C H I O N * - O * K o r n c * 
3 0 « W C S T M A I N j T u c r r 
A M M l C A N r O « K , UTAH ««40O3 
T C U C P M O N C l a o n 7 3 e - 7 a s « 
PACSIMILC (SOU 7 S « . 7 Q 9 9 
January 11 , 1995 
(HAND DELIVERED) 
( 2:£Q p.m.) 
Jan Miller 
1095 North 150 West 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Re: Demand L e t t e r 
Dear J a n : 
I am enclosing the original quit-claim deed resolving the 
boundary dispute between you and the Chipmans. I strongly urge you 
to sign the deed and deliver it to Mountain West Title Company, 871 
South Orem Boulevard, Orem, Utah, rio later than January 13, 1995. 
I have met with you and understand your position in this matter. 
I have extensively reviewed legal documents, deeds, and plats 
relating to the disputed land area and I have come to the 
conclusion that it is unreasonable for you to delay signing any 
longer- I believe any arguments you may raise in defense to this 
case would be frivolous. I understand you may not agree with my 
characterization of the case. However, I believe the following 
documents set forth in chronological order will explain how I 
arrived at that conclusion. 
I have attached two maps that will assist you in locating the 
areas discussed in the various deeds I will reference. The first 
**p shows the general area and the general relationship of the 
disputed property to other adjoining properties. The second map is 
*ore detailed containing the actual survey boundaries. Both maps 
are color coded to reflect the various deeds. 
!• Exhibit A is the warranty deed whereby the Chipmans 
acquired the corner lot identified in yellow. This deed 
did not convey title all the way to the fence line that 
has existed for decades. 
2« Exhibit B is a copy of the deed from you to NuTeam Inc. 
so they could proceed with rhe development of Kimberly 
Estates, This deed relates to the property identified in 
orange. This deed was executed in December 1991 and it 
is important because it shows as early as 1991, you were 
not paying for property taxes on the disputed area- The 
legal description of that deed shows the bearina of 
Jan Miller 
January 11, 1995 
Page 2 
"South S^S'lS" East along a fence line-'1 That is a 
very important bearing because it is the bearing related 
to the fence line which is the subject of this dispute. 
You did not purport to convey any property north of that 
fence line and NuTeam purchased only up to the fence 
line. 
3. Exhibit C is another document with your signature that 
relies on the fence line as a boundary. This is the 
document that apparently transfers your property from 
your trust to yourself as an individual. It is dated 
July 1993. The first part of the legal description 
refers to the area in pink, where your personal residence 
is located. You will note that the deed very clearly 
does not refer to property north of the fence line. 
Therefore your assertion that you had been paying 
property taxes on the disputed area is incorrect at least 
for recent years. The deed by which you hold the 
property clearly only goes to the fence line and no 
further. The second parcel of property identified in 
that deed is highlighted in blue. It also refers only to 
the fence line and does not purport to convey any 
interest nortlv of the fence line. 
4« Exhibit D is the plat map of Kimberly Estates and it 
shows that the old fence line was recognized by both 
Hillcrest Acres and Kimberly Estates as the property 
boundary between the two subdivisions. For 932.45 feet 
the dividing boundary betweea the two subdivisions is the 
fence running south 89°49/ east. The only place where 
that is not the case is the last 61.28 feet in the 
northeastern property boundary where Kimberly Estates 
Subdivision specifically extends north of the fence line 
by 5.3 6 feet. All landowners on both sides of the fence 
for hundreds of feet accept the fence line and the 
bearing boundary that it creates as the appropriate 
property boundary line. The only exception is a little 
jog of 3 34 square feet where NuTeam, Inc., (Kimberly 
Estates) purchased additional property north of its lot 
44. 
5« Exhibit E is the quit-claim deed describing the 61 foot 
by 5 foot piece of land bought by Kimberly Estates north 
of the fence line. This area is identified in purple. 
Like NuTeam, Inc., if you claim property north of the 
fence line, you would have to buy it from the owners just 
like NuTeam, Inc., did. 
Jan Miller 
January 11, 1995 
Page 3 
6. The last exhibit, Exhibit F, is a subdivision plat for 
your own Miller Hilltop Subdivision. It too shows that 
your subdivision generally accepted the fence line as the 
boundary between Chipmans and your property. Once again 
the boundary identified on the plat map is the bearing "S 
39049/13,, E" which correlates to the bearing of the fence 
line. Further, the easterly boundary of the subdivision 
shows a distance of 171.1 feet, which is the distance to 
the fence as is evidenced by the survey prepared by Cole 
Surveying and Engineering. 
I believe these various documents clearly show that the 
Chipmans are entitled to the area identified in green. At least 
three of the documents, Exhibits B, C, and F, were prepared bv you 
or your agents. Each of those documents bears your signature and 
reaffirms the fence line and its bearing (S 89a49'13" E) as the 
boundary between you and the Chipmans. For you to now be asserting 
an interest in property north of the fence line is unreasonable* 
Your claim that you have been paying property taxes on the disputed 
area is also invalid based upon these documents that show at least 
in recent years you have only been paying property taxes on the 
areas contained within the legal descriptions which reference the 
fence line. 
I understand that you are concerned about the short strip of 
hedge that runs along the north side of your driveway. The hedge 
has existed there for about five decades and constitutes a "visible 
line" serving as a boundary just as real as the concrete fence of 
which it is an extension. That hedge has divided your property 
from the Chipmans7 property for almost 50 years and it should not 
be disturbed unless there is some other replacement barrier to 
divide the properties. Based upon "boundary by acquiesence," the 
Chipmans have the same right to assert ownership over the area 
enclosed by the hedge as they do to assert ownership over the area 
enclosed by the fence line. The hedge is part of the fence line 
boundary. However, the Chipmans are willing to relinquish control 
over that small area so long as a substitute fence or other 
suitable boundary is constructed on the fence line. The Chipmans 
have assured me that they would be willing to split any costs 
incurred in constructing a suitable boundary enclosure that 
terminates on the existing corner post. In other words, the 
Chipmans are willing to relocate the hedge or other boundary marker 
to correlate to the survey property line so long as the current 
hedges are replaced by some other suitable boundary divider. 
In conclusion, please deliver the executed deed to Mountain 
West Title Company on or before January 13, 1995. I will be 
calling the title company at 5:00 p.m. on the 13th and if the 
misc-corr-5\chpran-cv.Itr i 
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
JANICE R, MILLER* TRDSTEB 
County or n»«h 
JANICE R« MILLER* TRQSXBB 
TEH DOLLARS AM) OTHER GOOD AMD VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 
tne following described tact of land in usta 
State of Uttk 
grantor 
, Sate of Utah, hereby 
grantee 
for the sum of 
— DOLLARS, 
County, 
EXHIBIT "A* ASHCBED MADE A PART 
/ o f-
Wmn» the hand of Mid grantor .this 7tH 
« a f , A. D. 19 *j 
day of 
J^AMXCE R« MILLER/ SRDSXEB 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Otah 
On the
 7 t h 
ss. 
day of A-D.ooc w
~ —
 7 t l i — 7 w j ^ -
thousand nine hundred and ninety-thro* personally appeared before me 
JAXXCE R. K U A , TRBSIEE 
thejagner of*tbe withif* instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the same. 
Residing in. 
Nocaiy Public 
My ootnmtoion expires. 
|3 
\fc-r- DcpAookL Pl«*_ Kc£.z 




VOX eaa* lac. 
County of Utah 
grantor 
State of Utah, hereby 
°£ Salt Lake, Salt Lata, Utah 
TBK fir MO/104 and other good and •alnable considerations 
grantee 
for the nun of 
the following described tract of land in 




Be^ianin* at a bowdary corier oa the Sooth boaadary Una of Hill Crest 
Acres Subdivision, Plat T , said boundary corier i s located Sooth 
8*»49'S7~ Bast 49.2* feet fro* tfc* Soethvest Corner of lot 201 of said 
sabdivisioa; thane* forth S.3* feat aloe? said boaadary l ine; thane* East 
61.2S feet aloe* taid boaadary line; theaco Soath 0#56'00* Vast 5*54- feat; 
Mortlratf49#S7* Vest 61.19 feet to t*» podnt ot baalnftina* 
itaiaia* 334 separ* feet* 
WTIHEM the hand of 
October A-D» 
, 4 * Twenty-sixth 
etna oaaoced sad 
dflJPOK 
Signed in the presence o£ 
Hal?is V. Frandsea 22X. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Onxajoi 
On the
 f / 
jJXAfmmnA mnr Snmdied and 
HalTin V. Frandsen 
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M 10. The fence and hedge have existed for more than 20 
2 years and have continually been accepted and treated by 
3 plaintiffs, and their predecessors in title, and by the 
4 defendants' predecessors in title, as the boundary line between 
5 their respective properties during that time. 
6 11. At the time the defendants acquired title to the lands 
7 lying south of the fence and hedge line, the fence and hedge was 
8 already in existence upon the plaintiffs' land and separated the 
9 plaintiffs' land from the land acquired by the defendants* The 
10 defendants acquired the land with full knowledge of the location^ 
11 of the fence and hedge and understood that plaintiffs and their 
12 predecessors claimed title to all land to the north of the fence 
13 and hedge. 
14 12. The defendants' predecessors in title, with full 
15 knowledge of the location of the fence and hedge, acquiesced, 
16 agreed to, and recognized the location of the fence and hedge as 
17 the agreed upon dividing line between the plaintiffs' and 
18 defendants' property. 
19 13. In the past, Defendant Miller acknowl edged the 
20 boundary created by the fence line. In December of 1991 
21 Defendant Miller executed a deed of real property to NuTeam, 
22 Inc. The legal description in the defendant's deed employed the 
23 fence line which is in dispute in this action as the northern 
24 

























HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Gordon Duval, Bar No. 6532 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
0.10 South Main Street 
pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
telephone (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile (801) 785-0853 
(CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
(JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON, 
land KIM ANDERSON. 
Defendants. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, 3TATS OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT OF CURTIS 
CHIPMAN 
Civil No. 950400145 
Judge Guy R. Buraingham 
(STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
pOUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, CURTIS CHIPMAN, being first duly sworn upon my oath, 
declare and state as follows: 
1. I am a plaintiff in this matter. 
2. In discussions with Jan Miller in the spring of 1994 
(she told me that she owned property five feet over the fenceline. 
She told me that we had to buy that land from her. If we didn't 
bay her she said "I'll see that you will never sell a bit of that 
ground." I believe that this is almost a direct quote. 
3. In the spring of 1994 I gave Jan's son-in-law a copy of 
(the attached newspaper article trying to convince her that she 
|»is€-ptdg-AchipMn\affidavit 1 j I 

























had no right to claim our property north of the fenceline. I 
[asked the son-in-law to give the article to Jan Miller. 
4. At the Planning Commission meeting of June IS, 1994, 
[Tan Miller appeared and objected to our request for a building 
permit so she could prevent our son from getting a building 
permit. Her actions caused us to lose hundreds of dollars and 
jthree months of building time. 
FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
\ ^ DATED this day of May, 1995, 
CURTIS CHIPMAN 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / ^ 
1995 • 
day of May, 
» -——— NOTARY PU8UC ^ 
SUSAN K. HARRIS 





RESIDING AT UTAH COUNTY 


























HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Gordon Duval, Bar No. 6532 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
0.10 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
telephone (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile (801) 785-0853 
[CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
Krs. 
(JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON, 
land KIM ANDERSON. 
Defendants. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY/ STATE OP UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT OF FAY 
CHIPMAN 
Civil No. 950400145 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
(STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
pOUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, FAY CHIPMAN, being first duly sworn upon my oath, declare 
land state as follows: 
1. I am a plaintiff in this matter. 
2. In discussions with Jan Miller in the spring of 1994 
ishe told me that she owned property five feet over the fenceline. 
She told me that we had to buy that land from her for $12,000.00. 
If we didn't pay her she said "I'll see that you will never sell 
k bit of that ground." I believe that this is almost a direct 
quote. 
• i sc- pldg- Ach«pavt\af f t d«vi t I* 

























3. At the Planning Commission meeting of June 15, 1994, 
|Jan Miller appeared and objected to our request for a building 
permit so she could prevent our son from getting a building 
ermit. 
FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this \$ day of May, 1995. 
P 
1995. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of May, 
NOTARY SIGNAQ 
RESIDING AT UTAH COUNTY 
misc-pldg- AchipmnVaf f idavi t 
\°[ 
RAY M. M A A O I N O , J R . 
J A M C 3 ' T U C K C P " M A N S C N 
O O R O O N OUVAL 
M A W H A C L 3. WITT 
C. VAU MOACCV 
H A R D I N G & A S S O C I A T E S , P.C. 
A T T O R N C Y S AT LAW 
I IO S O U T H M A I N S T U f f T 
P L B A S A 5 T OHOVE, UTAH 8 4 0 6 2 
T C L C P H O N C ( S O U 7 8 9 - 5 3 S O 
r A C S i M I L C ( S O U 7 S 5 - 0 6 9 3 A M C R I C A N roAK o r n c c 
3 0 « WCST MAIN STREET 
A M E R I C A N r O R K . UTAH S * 0 0 3 
T C L C R H O N C (SOD 7 S « - 7 « 8 B 
FACSIMILE (SOU 7 5 6 - 7 8 9 * 
TO: 
FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL 
Cover Sheet for FAX Transmissions 
From HARDING fr ASSOCIATES, PC 
FAX No* (801) 785-0853 
Craia Snvder 
RE: Chioman v. Miller 
FROMr 
COMMENTS: 
Gordon Duval /?<& 
No. of pages sent (Including cover sheet) 
I have attached the document we discussed earlier. 
If you will confirm in writing that Dana and Kim 
Anderson do not claim an interest in property north 
of the fence line between Andersons and Chipmans, 
then I will aladlv prepare an order dismissing Dana 
and Kim from the lawsuit. As to Jan Miller, Please 
answer on her behalf by close of business on 
Wednesday, April 5, 1995. Thank vou. 
gd.fonosVfonn. Itr 
ao 
TRANSMISSION PEPORT APR 03 '35 14:13 
RECEIUER: 3T74991 
PAGES SENT: 02 
DURATION: 01:12 
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I IO S O U T H * A I N S T W C C T 
PUBASAXT OBOVTBJ. UTAH 4 4 0 6 2 
TCLC^MONC (SOU 7 i 0 - 5 3 8 O 
Gordon D u v a l ^ 
Y/V<?5 
/¥|;lkr 
AMCWICAN 'Off* 0 # 1 C C 
3 0 * 1 WCST MAIM STttCCT 
A M M I C A N * 0 * X . U T A * S 4 0 C 3 
T C L t P H O N C (SOU 7 S « - 7 « a « . 
Enclosed p l ease f ind: anok^r 0uiV-claim. C{AA.O J^ *- y^w cb*%4. 
H k<u*_ ao+ c^tlsrU ya^r Mtr ye f , fcuf **-*+. 11 " ^ ^ 
J*L 
Comments: 
For your information 
In accordance vitit your- request, r 
have signed and forwarded it to the? 
court for signature* 
Please sign before a notary publio 
and return 
Please telephone me 
Please handle 
Please sign and return 
Please approve as to form and return 
Please review and call me 
immediately to discuss 
gd-f onm\f ormA tr 
<25* 
£ j t H t t / + ^ 
RAY M. H A A O l N Q , J R . 
J A M C S " T U C K E R " H A N S C N 
O O f l O O N O U V A L 
M A R S H A L L S. WITT 
C. VAL MORUCV 
H A R D I N G & A S S O C I A T E S , P.C. 
A T T O R N f Y S A T L A W 
HO S O U T H M A I N S T R E E T 
PT-BASAXT OHOVB, UTAJH S 4 0 6 8 
T C U C P H O N C (SOU 7 8 S - 5 3 S O 
F A C S I M I L E 1 8 0 0 7 S S - O 0 9 3 A M M I C A N roAK o m c c 
3 0 « WCST MAIN S T U f f T 
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FACSIMILE (SOI) 7 9 6 - 7 6 9 9 
TO: 
FAC8IMILB TRANSMITTAL 
Cover Sheet for FAX Transmissions 
From HARDING & ASSOCIATES, PC 
FAX No. (801) 785-0853 
Craia Snyder 
RE: Chipman v . M i l l e r 
FROM: Gordon Duval (*Q 
No. of pages sent (Including cover sheet) 
COMMENTS: I have not vet received the letter you mentioned or 
the signed quit-claim deed. I will need to file a 
default judgment against Jan Miller on 4-18-95. I 
will not file the default judgment against the 
Andersons based on vour representation that you will 
confirm in writing that the Andersons do not assert 
an interest in Chioman's property. 
misc-corr-6\chipnm-cv. ttr y\Wb±k ok 
3o ^ 3 
APR 16 *95 07:22 . 
toil l^ /JT*5' fr <#^d«if-
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Jackson Howard 
Deo R. Pcttraai 
Craig M. Snyder 
John U Vakncnc 
D. David Lambert 
Fred D. Howard 
Lcalk W. Skugh 
i v n t i b w /^^i/ v,wv»noeJUJK5 AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
FoftOfBoa BoxTTS 
Prove. Utah 14603 
Takpbooa:<W0 3*73-a345 
FKsnmk: (901) 377-4991 
Richard W. Dtyoct 




April 14, 1995 
VIA FAX # 78S41SS3 
Gordon Duval, Esq. 
Harding & Associates 
110 South Main 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Re: Chipman v. Miller and Anderson 
Dear Gordon: 
Enclosed please find a copy of the Warranty Deed from Janice R. Miller to Dr. Dana 
A. Anderson and his wife, Kim. Please be advised that Dr. and Mrs. Anderson do not claim 
any interest in any property north of the existing fence line between the Anderson property and 
the Chipman property. As I have indicated to you, Dr. Anderson believes that he and his wife 
should not have been included as parties to the Chipmans' litigation. 
I have also reviewed the allegations contained in your complaint with Mrs. Miller. I 
have explained to her my understanding of the law with regard to boundary line by acquiescence 
and I have also provided her with a copy of the information mat you furnished to me from 
Pleasant Grove City concerning the hedge. Part of the problem is obviously that the ground 
slopes significantly so that Mrs. Miller's driveway is actually significantly below 42 inches from 
the top of the hedge. Nonetheless, Mrs. Miller is willing to sign a quit claim deed to the 
Andersons if you will provide one that is consistent with a survey of the fence line. 
I will endeavor to have her sign that quit claim deed to comply with your deadline^ 
however, she will not agree to pay attorney fees to your clients and quite frankly I believe you. 
have no statutory basis for an award of attorney fees herein, particularly if she concedes the 
allegations contained in your complaint. Furthermore, from our standpoint Dr. Anderson has 
a claim for attorney fees in connection with these proceedings mat is probably superior from a 
legal point of view to any claim that your clients may make against Mrs. Miller. 
If this matter can be resolved on the basis suggested in this letter, please advise me 
immediately. If it cannot, then it will be Mrs. Miller's intent to contest any request that yott 
may make for attorney fees and it will be Dr. Anderson's intent to assert attorney fees against 
your client and sanctions in accordance with Rule 11. 
0\ \i? 
H A R D I N G & A S S O C I A T E S , P.C. 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
HO S O U T H M A I N 3 T R C C T 
PLEASANT GROVB. UTAH 8 4 0 6 2 
BAY M M A R O I N O . J « . 
jAMCS " T U C K I R * H A N S C N 
Q O R O O N O U V A L 
MARSHALL S. WITT 
C. VAL MOf lLCY 
T C L C P H O N C ( S O U 7 8 3 - 9 3 S O 
r A C S l M I L C ( S O U 7 8 5 - 0 6 5 3 
April 18, 1995 
Fax and Mail Delivery 
A M M I C A N r o « K o r n c c 
3 0 e WEST MAIN STRCCT 
A M E R I C A N r O R K , UTAH « 4 0 0 3 
T C L C P H O N C (SOD 7 S 6 - 7 Q B 6 
r A C S l M I L C (SOU 7 9 6 - 7 6 9 9 
Craig Snyder 
120 East ^00 North 
Provo, UT 84606 
Re: Chipman v. Miller 
Dear Craig: 
This letter serves as a follow-up to our telephone 
conversation earlier today when I indicated an answer would be due. 
I wanted to clarify that no answer is due from the Andersons. An 
answer is only due from Ms. Miller, as previously stated in my 
April 3, 1995, fax to you, I will prepare an order dismissing Dana 
and Kim from the lawsuit based upon the letter I received from you 
Friday indicating the Andersons are not claiming any interest in 
property north of the existing fenceline between the Andersons and 
the Chipmans. 
You indicated you had a quit-claim deed signed by Ms. Miller 
and could send me a copy of it. You also indicated you intended to 
take additional actions escalating this lawsuit. To avoid an 
escalation of this situation, I am granting to you an extension of 
time to file an answer until close of business on April 21, 1995. 
That will allow me a chance to visit with my clients to see how 
they want to proceed now that Ms. Miller has apparently signed a 
quit-claim deed and you are in the process of delivering that deed 
to me. To assist in the possible settlement of this situation, 
please fax me a copy of the deed your client has signed, as well as 
mailing the original to me as we previously discussed. 
Thank you for your assistance and if you have any questions, 
please feel free to give me a call. 
Sincerely, 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
GORDON DUVAL 
Attorney at Law 
GD:skh 
cc: Fay and Curtis Chipman 
•Wc-
vQeoo^c^ Coh p~^ 
corr-6\chipman-cv.ltr 
<2\l 
CRAIG M. SNYDER (3033), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 Our File No. 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON 
and KIM ANDERSON, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS DANA 
ANDERSON AND KIM ANDERSON, 
COUNTERCLAIM AND REQUEST 
FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
Case No. 950400145 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW the defendants Dana Anderson and Kim Anderson and answer the 
Complaint of the plaintiffs on file herein and admit, deny and allege as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
There has been a complete accord and satisfaction in connection with this matter, since 
the defendant Janice Miller has tendered a quit claim deed signed by her on the 14th day of 
April, 1995, to the plaintiffs through their counsel. Said quit claim deed was prepared by 
plaintiffs' counsel. 
i&corcJ o=H^ ur\ 
SECOND DEFENSE 
These defendants have never claimed any interest in any property lying north of the 
fence line that exists between these defendants' property and the property owned by the 
plaintiffs. These defendants have never had any conversation with the plaintiffs concerning any 
property dispute. These defendants have informed the plaintiffs through counsel on April 7, 
1995, and in writing on April 14, 1995, that they claimed no interest in the property lying north 
of the fence line between these defendants and the plaintiffs, property. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
1. These defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 
of the plaintiffs' Complaint. 
2. These defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
3. Answering paragraph 6 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, these defendants reallege 
and incorporate by reference their answers to the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 
5 of the plaintiffs' Complaint 
4. These defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the 
plaintiffs' Complaint. 
5. Answering paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs* Complaint, these defendants deny that 
there is a hedge between their property and the property of the plaintiffs, although these 
2 
defendants believe that there does exist a hedge between the plaintiffs' property and that of the 
co-defendant Miller's property. 
6. Answering paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 of plaintiffs' Complaint, these 
defendants admit the allegations contained therein with the exception of the reference to the 
hedge between these defendants and the plaintiffs' property. 
7. These defendants are without sufficient knowledge and information to form a 
belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of plaintiffs' 
Complaint, Said allegations appear to apply to the co-defendant Miller, and these defendants 
are without knowledge as to the truth of said allegations and, therefore, these defendants have 
no basis to either admit or deny said allegations. These defendants, however, do not assert any 
right, title or interest in the property lying north of the fence line that exists between these 
defendants' property and the plaintiffs' property. 
8. These defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 17 and 18 of 
plaintiffs' Complaint. 
9. These defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the 
plaintiffs' Complaint. 
10. These defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 20 of the 
plaintiffs' Complaint. 
3 
11. Answering paragraph 21 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, these defendants reallege 
and incorporate herein by reference each and every response made by these defendants to 
paragraphs 1 through 20 of the plaintiffs' Complaint. 
12. Answering paragraph 22 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, these defendants assert 
that they have never claimed any interest in property owned by the plaintiffs north of the existing 
fence line between the plaintiffs' property and these defendants' property. Furthermore, these 
defendants have informed the plaintiffs through their counsel orally on April 7, 1995, and by 
letter dated April 14, 1995, that they assert no claim to any property lying north of the existing 
fence line. These defendants deny that the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees based upon § 
78-27-56, and they deny each and every other allegation contained in paragraph 22 of the 
plaintiffs* Complaint. 
13. These defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of the 
plaintiffs' Complaint. 
WHEREFORE, these defendants pray that plaintiffs take nothing by way of the Second 
Cause of Action of their Complaint, that the plaintiffs be awarded the relief sought by their First 
Cause of Action, since these defendants have never claimed any interest in any property located 
north of the existing fence line, and that these defendants be awarded their costs and attorney 
fees incurred in this action in accordance with the allegations contained in the attached 
Counterclaim, together with such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and 




COME NOW the defendants Dana Anderson and Kim Anderson and counterclaim 
against the plaintiffs and for a cause of action allege: 
1. The action brought by plaintiffs against these defendants is without merit and 
is neither brought nor asserted in good faith. 
2. These defendants have never claimed any right, title or interest in property 
owned by the plaintiffs located north of the existing fence line between the plaintiffs' property 
and these defendants' property. 
3. These defendants should never have been named as parties to this action. 
4. The existing deed to these defendants in their record chain of title does not 
claim any property located north of the existing fence line. 
5. These defendants are entitled to their attorney fees pursuant to the provisions 
of § 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
6. Plaintiffs' complaint against these defendants is not well grounded in fact nor 
is it warranted by existing law, and further, it is not interposed for any proper purpose. 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint and their request for attorney fees is made only for purposes of harassment 
and to needlessly increase the cost of this litigation. These defendants are entitled to sanctions, 
including attorney fees and costs in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
5 
WHEREFORE, these defendants pray that the Court award their attorney fees and court 
costs in accordance with the provisions of § 78-27-56 and/or Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, together with such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper 
in these premises. 
DATED this ** day of April, 1995. 
CRAIG M. SNYDER, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this (% day of April, 1995. 
Gordon Duval 
Harding & Associates 
110 South Main Street 





CRAIG M. SNYDER (3033), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
1*0 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone; (801) 373-^345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Our File No. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY 
CHIPMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
t f C 
vs. 
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON 
and KIM ANDERSON, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT JANICE 
MILLER, COUNTERCLAIM AND 
REQUEST FOR RULE 11 
SANCTIONS 
Case No. 950400145 
Judge Guy R. Bumingham 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW the defendant Janice Miller and answers the Complaint of the plaintiffs 
on file herein and admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
There has been an accord and satisfaction in connection with this matter, since the 
defendant Janice Miller has tendered a quit claim deed signed by her on the 14th day of April, 
eeco^d cM-^\ 33 
1995, to the plaintiffs through their counsel. Said quit claim deed was prepared by plaintiffs' 
counsel. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' counsel has required defendant Janice Miller to file this Answer on the basis 
that plaintiffs' counsel still believes that there exists a right to attorney fees on behalf of 
plaintiffs under § 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. See affidavit of Craig 
M. Snyder attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
1. This defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of 
the plaintiffs' Complaint, 
2. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
3. Answering paragraph 6 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, this defendant realleges and 
incorporates by reference her answer to the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 5 of 
the plaintiffs' Complaint. 
4. This defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20 of the plaintiffs' Compliant. 
5. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
2 3 
6. Answering paragraph 21 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, this defendant realleges 
and incorporates herein by reference each and every response made by this defendant to 
paragraphs 1 through 20 of the plaintiffs' Complaint* 
7. Answering paragraph 22 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, this defendant alleges that 
she asserts no defense to this action, and that her only response to this action has been in good 
faith to seek the advice of counsel and to provide the plaintiffs with a quit claim deed concerning 
the property in question, even though that property is not described by the plaintiffs in their 
Complaint. This defendant further alleges that she has acquiesced in and agreed with every 
request made by the plaintiffs in their First Cause of Action and only disputes the claim of the 
plaintiffs to attorney f^c$ under § 78-27-56, This defendant denies that plaintiffs are entitled to 
attorney fees in this matter. 
8. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of the plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
WHEREFORE, this defendant prays that plaintiffs take nothing by way of the Second 
Cause of Action of their Complaint, that the plaintiffs be awarded the relief sought by their First 
Cause of Action, and that this defendant be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred in this 
action in accordance with the allegations contained in the attached Counterclaim, together with 
such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper in these premises. 
3 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW the defendant Janice Miller and counterclaims against the plaintiffs and 
for cause of action alleges: 
1 • This defendant has been required by counsel for the plaintiffs to file an answer 
to the Second Cause of Action of plaintiffs' Complaint. (See Affidavit of Craig M. Snyder 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.) 
2. Said request on behalf of plaintiffs' counsel is without merit and is not brought 
or asserted in good faith. 
3. The request of plaintiffs made through their counsel is frivolous and made 
contrary to the provisions of § 78-27-56. 
4. Counsel for this defendant has previously informed counsel for plaintiffs that 
this defendant has acquiesced in and consented to all of the relief claimed in plaintiffs' First 
Cause of Action, and that this defendant had signed a quit claim deed prepared by counsel for 
the plaintiffs and that counsel for this defendant has delivered that quit claim deed to counsel for 
the plaintiffs on April 18, 1995, or by mail as requested by counsel for the plaintiffs. 
5. Said request for attorney fees violates the provisions of Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and is designed to harass, cause unnecessary delay or to needlessly 
increase the cost of litigation. 
6. This defendant is entitled to her attorney fees and court costs incurred herein 
in being forced to respond to the request for attorney fees and in accordance with the provisions 
4 
of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 178-27-56 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
WHEREFORE, this defendant prays that the Court award her attorney fees and court 
costs in accordance with the provisions of § 78-27-56 and/or Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, together with such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper 
in these premises. 
DATED this 1% day of April, 1995. 
CRAIG M. SNYDER, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this /c day of April, 1995. 
Gordon Duval 
Harding & Associates 
UO South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
- 3 * JL"^7** 
SECRETARY 
5 
have never had any claim or deed to the disputed property and never should have been a party 
to this action. Furthermore, counsel for the Andersons notified the plaintiffs by telephone and 
later in writing that the Andersons claimed no interest in the disputed property. Memorandum 
in Support of Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Attorney's Fees, Exhibit K (fax from Mr. Snyder to 
Mr. DuVal, dated April 14, 1995). For all the above reasons, the defendants should be awarded 
their attorney fees and costs and sanctions in accordance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
DATED this ^ day of May, 1995. 
CRAIG M. SNYDER, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
v ^ e c o ' o l cM- <?> * 
GORDON DUVAL — No. 6532 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
IN THE POURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE 07 UTAH 
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON, and 
KIM ANDERSON. 
Defendants. 
STIPULATED ORDER FOR 
DISMISSAL OF TWO 
DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 950400145 
Judge 
The parties hereby agree that Dana Anderson and Kim Anderson 
should be dismissed from this litigation. This dismissal shall be 
with prejudice. 
DATED this 20 day of April, 1995. 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
DATED this 
GORDON DUVAL 
day of April, 1995. 
h»kfri na**-!! . 
CRAIG SNYDER 
nisc-pldgs-7\chipMn\stip-ord.dMi 
gccord- OJr \\3 
EXHIBfL-Q. 
- 3°l 
GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
1 „ ORDER 
2 I  Based upon the above stipulation of the parties, IT IS HEREBY 
3 i  ORDERED that Dana and Kim Anderson be dismissed from this 
4 |l litigation. This dismissal is with prejudice. 
5 DATED this day of April, 1995. 














































I certify that a true and correct copy of the STIPULATED ORDER 
FOR DISMISSAL was mailed the /0+~~€&{ of April, 1995, postage 
prepaid, to: 
CRAIG M. SNYDER 
120 East 300 North 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON and 
KIM ANDERSON, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. 950400145 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Cross Motions for 
Attorney's fees. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and 
upon being advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Pursuant to UCA § 78-27-56, Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees is DENIED 
and Defendant's request for attorney's fees is GRANTED in the amount of $484.00. 
Counsel for die Defendant is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
Ott. 2 e tr: 4 A 
-Record 03 \1°\ 
ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the 
Court for signature. 
Dated th i s^day of July, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Gordon Duval, Esq. 
Craig M. Snyder, Esq. 
Ruling Page -2-
CRAIG M. SNYDER (3033), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our File No. 23,152 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON 
and KIM ANDERSON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 950400145 
This matter came on regularly before the court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501, 
the Code of Judicial Administration on Cross Motions each seeking an award of attorney's fees. 
The court has reviewed the motions made by both parties as considered the memoranda and 
affidavits submitted by counsel and after reviewing the pleadings on file herein and being fully 
advised in the premises does now make and enter the following order and judgment. It is hereby 
ordered adjudged and decreed: 
1. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56, plaintiffs* request for attorney's 
fees is denied. 
Record <& i4^ M-
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56, defendants' request for attorney's 
fees is granted and defendants are awarded judgment against the plaintiffs in the amount of 
$484.00. 
3. Said judgment shall accrue interest at the legal rate of 9.22% from date hereof 
until paid in full. 
DATED this day of August, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
GORDOJfDUVAL, for: 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES 






















S $ I H COUHTf 
GORDON DUVAL — No. 6532 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, L . L . C . 
P II A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
" 110 South Main S t r e e t 
P l e a s a n t Grove , Utah 84062 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 785-5350 3 
4 
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6 || CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF 
OBJECTIONS TO THE 
PROPOSED ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT 
JANICE MILLER, DANA ANDERSON, and 
KIM ANDERSON. 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 950400145 
Judge Guy Burningham 
This court has issued a ruling denying the plaintiffs' motion for 
attorney's fees and granting the defendants' motion for attorney's 
fees. The defendants have proposed an order and judgment 
incorporating this court's ruling. (Attached.) The plaintiffs' 
objection is that neither the ruling, the order, nor the judgment 
1 7 || contain any findings of fact, conclusions of law, or other reasoning 
that would allow the plaintiffs to evaluate whether an appeal is 
appropriate. 
There is no Evidence of Bad Faith as is Required by S78-27-56. 
The court has articulated no facts evidencing the Chipmans acted in 
bad faith. The plaintiffs do not believe there are any such facts. 
They do not believe they acted in bad faith. They filed suit against 
the defendants to clear title to property that has been owned by 
their family for decades. The plaintiffs worked for many months 

























trying to obtain from the defendants the documents necessary to clear 
title to the plaintiffs' land. Only after many months of fruitless 
negotiation with the defendants did the plaintiffs file suit. Even 
after a written demand letter detailing the extreme weakness of the 
defendants' legal position, the defendants would not respond or 
provide the required documents. The plaintiffs had no option but to 
file litigation to clear the title on their property. The Chipmans 
patiently acted in good faith for many months trying to obtain clear 
title to their property short of litigation, and in filing suit they 
were similarly acting in good faith. 
The naming of the Andersons as defendants was not an action 
prompted by or evidence of bad faith. As the minutes of the American 
Fork Planning Commission reveal, there was a dispute between the 
Andersons and the Chipmans as to ownership of the land adjacent to 
the fence line. Demand letters were sent to the Andersons asking 
them to sign documents indicating they no longer claimed ownership of 
the Chipmans' land. The Andersons did not even respond. Instead, 
their mother-in-law adamantly asserted on their behalf that they 
would not relinquish control of that land short of litigation. Based 
upon the Andersons' silence and the representations of co-defendant 
Miller, the Chipmans named Andersons in the lawsuit. Once the 
Andersons, through their attorney, provided written documentation 
that the Andersons were no longer asserting interest in the disputed 
property, the Chipmans promptly dismissed the Andersons from the 

























litigation. These actions do not indicate bad faith on the part of 
the Chipmans. 
Defendant Miller also claimed an entitlement to attorney's fees 
based upon the fact that she filed an answer in this case. The 
defendant filed an answer even though she was given four extensions 
of time to answer, the last one being given specifically so the 
plaintiffs and their attorney could discuss ways to resolve this 
issue short of continued litigation. 
The Plaintiffs did not Advance Frivolous Litigation. The 
plaintiffs do not believe the actions they took resulted in frivolous 
litigation. They filed a complaint only after they had exhausted all 
other avenues over the course of many months. Similarly, they filed 
a motion for attorney's fees only in response to the defendants' 
motion for attorney's fees and sanctions. Admittedly there are no 
Utah cases holding that pre-litigation attorney's fees can be awarded 
pursuant to Section 78-27-56. But on the other hand, neither are 
there any Utah cases holding that pre-litigation attorney's fees can 
NOT be awarded pursuant to Section 78-27-56. Indeed, there are two 
ALR annotations citing numerous cases from other state and federal 
jurisdictions where pre-litigation costs have been awarded pursuant 
to statutes similar to Section 78-27-56. The plaintiffs cited 
numerous cases in support of their position while the defendants did 
not rebut the cases identified by the plaintiffs nor did the 
defendants cite other cases in opposition to the position advanced by 
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs do not believe it is frivolous to 

























advance arguments recognized and discussed at length in ALR 
citations. 
Attorney's Fees can Only be Awarded to the Prevailing Party. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56 states: "In civil actions, the 
court shall award attorney's fees to a prevailing party . . . ." No 
where in the Utah Code or in Utah cases is there authority for 
awarding attorney's fees to the losing party. In this case the 
Chipmans are the prevailing party. They filed a complaint so they 
could obtain the quit-claim deed they were entitled to. They 
obtained that deed through the litigation and are thus the prevailing 
party. The defendants did not prevail on any substantive claim or 
counter-claim. As the losing party the defendants have no claim or 
right to attorney's fees. 
An Award of Attorney's Fees Should be Made on the Basis of 
Findings of Fact Supported by the Evidence and Appropriate 
Conclusions of Law. Almost every Utah court faced with the issue of 
whether a trial judge must submit findings of fact and conclusions of 
law with an award or denial of attorney's fees has found that the 
trial judge should enter those findings and conclusions. For 
example, in Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985), the 
Supreme Court held that "attorney fees should be awarded on the basis 
of evidence and that findings of fact should be made which support 
the award." The Court of Appeals "has reversed attorney fee awards 
when the trial court failed to make appropriate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law." See, e.g.. Saunders v. Sharp. 818 P.2d 574 
Misc-pldgs-9\chipman\obj.neffl 4 
1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Similarly, in In re Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah 
2 Ct. App. 1989) , the Court of Appeals was compelled to remand the case 
~ to the trial court because of "[t]he absence in the record before us 
. of findings and conclusions on the issue of attorney fees . . . ." 
r Id. In this case, plaintiffs are unable to evaluate the 
fi appropriateness of an appeal without findings of fact and conclusions 
7„ of law from this court. 
o I Request for a Hearing or Written Explanation. Before this case 
Q comes to an end by way of a final judgment, the plaintiffs need some 
reasoning or other legal analysis the court's position on this issue. 
Alternatively, if the court would allow a hearing to explain the 
basis for the court's decision, then detailed written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law may be unnecessary. 
In conclusion, the plaintiffs object to the proposed order and 
judgment in that neither the proposed order and judgment nor the 








DATED t h i s liT day o f September, 1 9 9 5 . 



























GORDON DUVAL — No. 6532 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CURTIS CHIPMAN and FAY CHIPMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 




FOR A HEARING 
Civil No. 950400145 
Judge Guy Burningham 
Before this case comes to an end by way of a final judgment, 
plaintiffs request a hearing to verify the basis of the court's 
decision. 
DATED September lS~ . 1995. 
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,. I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF 
2
 I OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed, postage 
prepaid, September /< . 1995, to: 
CRAIG SNYDER 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, UT 84606 
FAY AND CURTIS CHIPMAN 
1105 North 150 West 
American Fork, UT 84003 
SECRETARY 
mi «c-pldfl8-9\ch I pman\obj .mm 52 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 





Civil No, 950400145 
HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
Defendant 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 5th day of 
October. 1995, the HEARING in the above-entitled matter 
was taken by Video Tape 
before the Honorable Guy Burningham 
nd was transcribed by Richard C. T.tton. a Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and Notary 
Public in and for the State 
u , j(,i,i District Court Building, 
of Utah at the Fourth J u d i c a l District 




























A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the P l a i n t i f f ; Mr. Gordon Duval 
Attorney at Law 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Gorve, Utah 84062 
For the Defendant: Mr. Craig Snyder 
Attorney at Law 
Provo, Utah 84601 
P R O C E I I H i ^ 
THE COURT: We are making our record on video 
tape today. We are here on File Number 950400145, Curtis 
Chipman vs. Oanice Mil ler. We are here on Plaintiffs 
, . f . see, there is an objection to a ruling and order and 
t h e n revested a hearing. From the memo, it sounds like 




























here and state exactly what it is, Mr. Duval, you would 
like this court to do or to consider. 
MR. DUVAL: Thank you, Your Honor. We understand 
what the court ruled but just didn't understand why. 
Before I could accurately advise my client onto what their 
options were, I needed to understand some of the Findings 
and Conclusions that led to the court's analysis and 
eventual ruling. 
We did not believe there was evidence in the file 
of bad faith nor that the defendants had prevailed nor did 
we think that the arguments that were advanced were 
frivolous . I have here, these are the ALR Citations, and 
cases that we have researched in preparing the memos. 
There is a significant volume of law, not necessarily from 
this state, but other states and we just need to understand 
the basis for the court's ruling. 
THE COURT: I think I can try to do that for you. 
Mr. Snyder any comment you wanted to make? 
MR. SNYDER: I don't think there is any comment 
I would make other than what I have indicated in the briefs 
that I submitted and the response that I made to Mr. Duval' 
original pleadings and motions. 
THE COURT: As I read 78-
MR. SNYDER: 27-56. 




























In the defendant's disclaimer of any interest in the 
property, the statute says that plaintiff cannot recover 
costs, And based on that and I understand the argument 
that you made, well, that is because they said that they 
weren't going to claim any interest, we ended up having 
to go ahead and file a lawsuit anyway. This statute doesn 
make a differentiation whether you file a lawsuit or 
not. The fact that they may have again taking your 
argument that I recall you having made to me, is that 
they drug their feet and caused you problems and so you fi 
a lawsuit. 
However, their answer did disclaim any interest 
in the property. And under 78-40-3 that precluded 
you from getting any costs. So when you filed your motion 
for attorney fees and costs, and I recall the, I think it 
was an affidavit in support of that, there were over 
$3,000.00 worth of attorney fees and costs on this 
thing which did seem excessive to the court. 
I guess one of the compelling arguments that was 
persuasive to me was in, I think it was the counter 
affidavit of Mr. Snyder, if I can find that. It was 
filed with the court on June the 12th of 1995, on the 
fourth page of that in what is Paragraph 6 Sub "J", he 
pointed out, as he went through your affidavit and I did 
as well. On April the 11th of 1995 you, Mr. Duval, spent 
5\J 
C-4 
1 I $25,00 worth of time or approximately 12 minutes 1n your 
2 hourly billing reviewing the merits for the claims 
3 for attorney fees. This is a parenthetical note of Mr. 
4 Snyder, He says that he found it extremely interesting 
5 that you spent approximately 12 minutes making a legal 
6 determination that you are entitled to attorney fees and 
7 costs totalling more than $3300.00. 
8 As we got here and I looked at 78-40-3:it appeared 
9 to me that you wouldn't be entitled to the costs associated 
10 with this matter. It was on that basis and on the motion 
11 and cross motion for attorney fees under 78-27-56 that 
12 because I did award some attorney fees. And let me explain 
13 how I arrived at those attorney fees. 
14 Mr. Snyder in his affidavit for attorney fees in 
15 Paragraph 8, I didn't allow him fees for the conference 
16 and review pleadings that occurred in March nor pleadings 
17 that were prepared in April. The only fees I allowed 
18 him were in May which was the opposition that he had to 
19 file to your motion for attorney fees, and for his review 
20 of the pleadings and proofing of the brief which was May 
21 5th of 1995, The memorandum that he submitted which 
22 was also May the 5th of 1995 and then the pleadings to 
23 reply to the motion which was on the 8th of May of 1995, 
24 if my calculations are correct, those four numbers 




























those they added up to $484,00, and so because he was the 
prevailing party on that motion, I gave him simply the 
fees that were generated to respond to that motion, nothing 
else. So that was the basis of my ruling. Normally 
on motions, I don't make findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. That is all they are is motions. Many times 
they are just overruled or sustained. That is how I 
arrived at it. 
In fairness and if you want to have that articulated 
in some findings since I did ask Mr. Snyder to prepare 
those, he could augment that, make the findings that I have 
just made and then submit them to you for approval as to 
form, and to the court for signature. I think then you wou 
have anything that you may need, at least, as far as my 
basis for reaching the conclusions I did, if you decide 
you want to appeal it for $480.00 attorney fees. 
MR. DUVAL: Thank you, Your Honor, that would be 
helpful. I think the reference to the one citation for 
25 minutes, I have four different memos to law clerks beforj! 
the complaint was ever filed regarding whether or not 
they would be entitled to attorney fees. So there was 
significant research. And matter of fact,part of that 
$3,000,00 was research on the issue of attorney fees before 
So I think the issue of the statute, I don't know that therje 




























pursuant to a statute, We were seeking relief pursuant 
to the bad faith statute and not a specific statute 
relating to a quiet title action. So that is why 
while that statute would apply to quiet title actions, it is| 
not even what we filed. We asked for a declaratory 
judgment on a boundary line issue, boundary by acquiescence 
and so that - -
THE COURT: Well, but the affect of that at 
least my interpretation of that is you were attempting 
to quiet title in the property that is in dispute. When 
the defendant backed off and said we are not claiming any 
interest in it, you know, you can have it, that is what that} 
statute really is designed, I think, to do. It is to save 
you money and time from having to go ahead and fight 
about it once you filed your pleadings. 
Now if I have misunderstood anything either one or both) 
of you ought to correct me. 
MR. DUVAL: Why I think in a quiet title action 
there is that element of quieting title as to two parties 
but there is also to all the world if anybody has an interest 
in that land. So it would be unfair to assess attorney 
fees to all the world when maybe a party is not 
affirmatively, aggressively asserting aninterest in the Ian P. 
as was the case with this particular person. So I think thjat 




























title statute they would say that you can't get attorney 
fees against everybody that you may have named because 
they may not be asserting an interest in that, 
THE COURT: Well, yes I understand that as well. 
As I went through the memorandum or the affidavits, excuse 
me, the affidavit of attorney fees, you know I kind of askecj 
myself was all of this necessary in light of what was 
occurring must the answer had been filed. And so I 
understand that a lot of time was spent in preparation 
of this but in light of that statute that was the basis 
that I wouldn't award attorney fees to you as a prevailing 
party because you didn't have to fight for it very hard, 
and that is what the statute says, 
MR. SNYDER: I think, just to add. This is clearly 
a quiet title action. Paragraph 20 of the complaint says 
that title to the disputed land should be quieted to the 
plaintiffs under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
It is clearly a quiet title action whatever theory you intejid 
to quite the title by whether it is acquiescence, whether 
it is some other theory, you are quieting title to the 
property. The statute clearly applies and you know two 
of these parties have never claimed an interest to the 
property that is in question, never have and never did. 
Mr s . Miller did but then after consulting with counsel 




























Mr. Duval was informed of that, 
THE COURT: Anything else Mr. Duval that you can 
go ahead and make your record today, I am going to have Mr. 
Snyder make the findings that I have indicated today. 
MRS. CHIPMAN: Can I say anything at all? 
THE COURT: Why don't you consult with Mr. Duval. 
This isn't an evidentiary hearing today. 
MRS. CHIPMAN: Such lies I can't believe it. 
She just give up that property, give up that property with 
no fight. I fought her for a whole year, 
MR. DUVAL: I think we understand the basis 
of the court's ruling, 
THE COURT: That was the reason, again I didn't ev 
give Mr. Snyder anything as far as his defense for 
preparation of those matters on your complaint, but only 
as to hii-m responding to to your motion for the attorney fees 
I felt that he was the prevailing party on that motion. 
So under 78-27-56 I thought was well taken. I did not feel 
like your claim for attorney fees was well taken in light 
of 78-40-3. 
MR. DUVAL: Your ruling mentions 27-56 is that 
also then a finding of bad faith on the Chipman's part 
and there was - -
THE COURT: 27-56 is the prevailing party statute] 




























MR. SNYDER: The claim was not brought or 
asserted in good faith is what it says, 
THE COURT: I didn't think it was in light of 
78-40-3. I just didn't think it was well taken at all 
and let me read that, 
I felt like it was without merit. In ltght of 
78-40-3 I don't think it was asserted in good faith. So 
that was the basis for the ruling. Like I say let's give 
the rationale so that you can argue that to someone and 
somebody else will tell me. 
MR. SNYDER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. DUVAL: Thank you. 
(WHEREUPON, this hearing was concluded) 
10 
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ment in that regard is reversed. The Court of Appeals decision is 
affirmed in all other respects. As is their remainder of the judg-
ment. 
GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur. 
PIVARNIK, J., not participating. 
•24 
ANNOTATION 
ATTORNEYS9 FEES: OBDURACY AS BASIS FOR 
STATE-COURT AWARD 
by 
Daniel P. Jones, J. D. 
TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY® REFERENCES 
20 Am Jur 2d, Costs 9 72; 22 Am Jur 2d. Damages 99 165, 168 
Annotations: See the related matters listed in the annotation. 
2 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev), Attorneys at Law, Forms 111.1, 193 
7A Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev), Costs, Forms 91-93 
3 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Attorneys at Law, Ch. 30 
2 Am Jur Proof of Facts 233, Attorneys* Fees 
1 Am Jur Trials 93, Setting the Fee 
US L Ed Digest. Attorneys' Fees 9 1; Costs and Fees 56 21 . 32-34 
ALR Digests, Attorneys' Fees 99 28-38; Costs and Fees ft 30; Damages 
99 393-393.5 
L Ed Index to Annos, Attorney and Client; Costs and Fees; Damages 
ALR Quick Index. Attorneys' Fees; Costs of Actions, Damages; Obdu-
racy 
Federal Quick Index, Attorneys' Fees; Costs and Fees; Damages; Obdu-
racy 
VERALEX™: Cases and annotations referred to herein can be further 
researched through the VERALEX electronic retrieval system's two 
services, Auto-Cite® and SHOWME™. Use Auto-Cite to check cita-
tions for form, parallel references, prior and later history, and 
annotation references. Use SHOWME to display the full text of cases 
and annotations. 
Coamik POCKET PART ia tkfc for 
•25 
OBDURACY: STATE rEE AWARDS *y ALKIIH 
49 ALR4th 825 
Attorneys* fees: obduracy as basis for state-court award 
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
J 1. Introduction: 
[a] Scope 
[b] Related matters 
S 2. Summary and comment: 
[a] Generally 
jb] Practice pointers 
II. OBDURACY IN PRELITIGATION CONDUCT 
§ 3. View tbat obduracy in prelitigation conduct cannot support 
award of attorneys' fees 
§ 4. View that obduracy in prelitigation conduct can support 
award of attorneys' fees: 
[a] Refusing to pay monetary claim 
[bj Misallocating funds 
[c\ Failing to establish legal right to property before as* 
suming ownership 
[d] Refusing to enforce statutory rights 
[e] Terminating contract 
HI. OBDURACY IN CONDUCT OF TRIAL LITIGATION 
§ 5. Prosecuting suit; baseless claim 
§ 6. Defending suit; meritless defense 
§ 7. Dismissing condemnation action 
§ 8. Failing to dismiss defendant 
§ 9. Objecting to motions 
§ 10. Protracting litigation needlessly 
§ 11. Obstructing court orders 
§ 12. Settling dispute: 
(a] Settling as evidence of obduracy 
(b | Refusing to sign settlement order 
IV. OBDURACY IN CONDUCT OF APPEAL 
§ 13. Filing frivolous appeal 
§ 14. Misstating facts in appellate record 
V. OBDURACY AS RELATED TO OTHER THEORIES AS BASIS 
FOR STATE COURT AWARD 
S 15. Civil rights statutes 
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Accounting books of municipality, 
M[b] 
Accrual of wages by deceased, fi 4[a) 
Accumulation of compensatory time. 
Adjoining )andowncra, herbicides, § 13 
Administrative appeal, $ IS 
Administrators and executors, 9 11 
Adoption procedures, 5 4[d] 
Advances to settle estate, § 11 
Agency handling adoption of children, 
M(dl 
Alimony, 9 10 
Allocation of funds, § 4(b) 
Answer to interrogatory or petition, 
HO 
Appeal, conduct at, 99 13, 14 
Application for retirement benefits, 
9 4(a] 
Arbitration panel, 9 10 
Assessment on real property, 99 5, 10, 
16 
Assumpsit actions, 9 6 
Assumption of ownership, failure to 
establish legal rights, 9 4[c] 
Attachment and garnishment, 9 10 
Audit of municipal accounts, 9 4(b) ' 
Automobiles, 99 4[e], 5, 8 
Bad checks, 9 3 
Banks and banking, 99 4[e], 5 
Baseless claims, 9 5 
Bid on ofTer to buy realty, 9 11 
Binding purchase agreement for prop-
erty, 9 4[c) 
Bonus accrued prior to death, 9 4[a] 
Bookkeeping methods, 9 4[bJ 
Building contract, 9 10 
Bulldozing activities, 9 4[c] 
Business condemnation, 9 3 
Cash payment in settlement of estate, 
911 
Checks and drafts, 99 3. 11 
Chemical herbicides, injunction 
• against, 9 13 
Children, 9 4[a, d] 
Cities and towns. 99 4(a, b], 5, 7, 13. 
16 
Civil rights, 59 4(d], 15 
Civil service commission, 9 10 
Claim, refusal to pay, 9 4[a] 
Class action, 9 6 
Clerk for municipality, financial defi-
ciencies, | 4(b) 
College faculty, reinstatement to, 9 15 
Commencement of litigation, 9 3 
Comment, 9 2 
Compensatory time of employee, 9 4[a] 
Compromise and settlement, 99 3, 5, 
11. 12. 14 
Condemnation of property, 99 3, 7 
Condominium-hotel, building contract, 
9 10 
Conference, pretrial, 9 11 
Conservation matters. 99 9. 13 
Contracts and agreements, 99 3, 4(a, 
cl. 10 
Conveyance of property, 99 3, 4(cJ, 5, 
11 
Corporate matters, 99 3, 4|a), 5 
County property taxes, 9 10 
Court orders. 99 9, 11. 12fb) 
Creditor's action, 99 5, 10 
Cystic fibrosis, child afflicted with, 
9 4[al 
Dealerships, 99 5, 13 
Decedents' estates, 99 4[a, b], 11, 14 
Deceit, 99 3, 4lbJ, 14 
Default judgments, 9 10 
Default of mortgage, 9 5 
Defense of suit, 9 6 
Delinquent wage taxes, 9 6 
Dependent children statute, 9 4[aJ 
Derivative action, 9 3 
Disabled persons, 9 4[a, d] 
Discharge from employment, 99 4(a), 
15 
Discrimination, 99 4(d), 15 
Dismissal of actions, 99 6-8 
Divorce and separation, 99 10, 11 
Drilling operations, 9 5 
Easements, 9 4(cl 
Education and schools, 99 4[d. el, 5. 
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Towns and cities, 99 4[a, b), 5, 7, 13, 
16 
Training of retarded and handicapped 
persons by school district, 5 4[d] 
Trespass action, 5 4[c] 
Trial, conduct at, 99 5*12 
Unemployment compensation benefits. 
«4[al 
Universities and Colleges, 9 15 
Unjust enrichment theory, 9 16 
Use of property, 9 4lc] 
Value of property for tax purposes, 
910 
49 ALR4th 
6. Vendor and purchaser, 99 3, 4[c], 5, 
10, 11 
Voluntary termination/of employment, 
* 4(a. c] 
Wages and salaries, 99 4(a, e], 6, 13 
Welfare and public assistance, 99 4[a], 
15 
Wells, drilling operations, 9 5 
Willful disregard of rights, 9 3 
Workers' compensation benefits, 9 4[a] 
Zoning dispute, 9 13 
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I. Preliminary matters 
$ 1. Introduction 
(a] Scope 
This annotation collects and ana-
lyzes the state cases discussing the 
allowance of an award of attorneys' 
fees on the basis of "obduracy" or 
"obdurate" behavior or conduct by 
a party or counsel to a party. Al-
though terms such as "bad faith," 
"vexatiousness," "wantonness," 
and the like may be used by courts 
discussing the "obduracy" or "ob-
durate behavior" concept, only 
those state cases dealing specifi-
cally with "obduracy," or conduct 
or behavior described as "obdu-
rate," are collected.1 
A number of jurisdictions may 
have rules, regulations, constitu-
tional provisions, or legislative en-
actments bearing upon this subject. 
Since these are discussed herein 
only to the extent that they are 
reflected in the reported cases 
within the scope of this annotation, 
the reader is advised to consult the 
appropriate statutory or regulatory 
compilations, 
[b] Related matters 
Allowance of attorneys' fees in 
1. For a discussion of federal court 
awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing 
parties based upon an adversary's bad 
faith, obduracy, or other misconduct, 
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49 ALR4th 825 
5Ub] 
proceedings. 34 
What constitutes bad faith on 
part of insurer rendering it liable 
for statutory penalty imposed for 
bad faith in failure to pay, or delay 
in paying, insured's claim. 33 
ALR4th 579. 
Authority of trial judge to im-
pose costs or other sanctions 
against attorney who fails to ap-
pear at, or proceed with, scheduled 
trial. 29 ALR4th 160. 
Award of attorneys' fees out of 
trust estate in action by trustee 
against cotrustee. 24 ALR4th 624. 
Authority of divorce court to 
award prospective or anticipated 
attorneys' fees to enable parties to 
maintain or defend divorce suit. 22 
ALR4th 407. 
Continuance of civil case as con-
ditioned upon applicant's payment 
of costs or expenses incurred by 
other party. 9 ALR4th 1144. 
Award of damages for dilatory 
tactics in prosecuting appeal in 
state court. 91 ALR3d 661. 
Right of party who is attorney 
and appears for himself to award 
of attorney's fees against opposing 
party as element of costs. 78 
ALR3d 1119. 
Validity of statute allowing attor-
neys' fees to successful claimant 
but not to defendant, or vice versa. 
73ALR3d515. 
Construction and application of 
state statute or rule subjecting 
party making untrue allegations or 
denials to payment of costs or at-
torneys* fees. 68 ALR3d 209. 
Who is the "successful party" or 
"prevailing party" for purposes of 
awarding costs where both parties 
prevail on affirmative claims. 66 
ALR3d 1115. 
Dismissal of plaintiff's action as 
entitling defendant to recover at-
torneys' fees or costs as "prevailing 
party" or "successful party." 66 
ALR3d 1087. 
Validity and construction of stat-
ute or rule allowing attorneys' fees 
to out-of-state defendant success-
fully defending suit brought in 
state. 51 ALR3d 1336. 
Allowance of attorneys' fees in 
civil contempt proceedings. 43 
ALR3d 793. 
Attorneys' fees or other expen-
ses of litigation as element in mea-
suring exemplary or punitive dam-
ages. 30 ALR3d 1443. 
Attorneys' fees as element of 
damages in action for false impris-
onment or arrest, or for malicious 
prosecution. 21 ALR3d 1068. 
Attorneys' fees incurred in litiga-
tion with third person as damages 
in action for breach of contract. 4 
ALR3d 270. 
Items of costs of prosecution for 
which defendant may be held. 65 
ALR2d 854. 
Allowance of attorneys' fees in, 
or other costs of, litigation by ben-
eficiary respecting trust. 9 ALR2d 
1132. 
Award of counsel fees to prevail-
ing party based on adversary's bad 
faith, obduracy, or other miscon-
duct. 31 ALR Fed 833. 
• 
Speiser, Attorneys' Fees (1973). 
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: 
Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 
Iowa L Rev 75. 
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Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees 
for Abuses of the Judicial System, 
61 NCL Rev 613 (1983). 
§ 2. Summary and comment 
[a] Generally 
The term "obdurate" has been 
defined by Webster's dictionary as 
"stubbornly persistent in wrongdo-
ing."1 In its legal sense, the term is 
rarely defined with such precision. 
Cases utilizing the term, or in its 
noun form "obduracy," tend to 
freely substitute as synonymous 
terms such as "bad faith," "vexa-
tiousness," wantonness," "oppres-
siveness," and even "obstreperous-
ness."* Though a precise legal defi-
nition of obduracy is lacking, the 
state cases collected connote gen-
erally a degree of stubbornness, 
obstinacy, or refusal to cooperate 
by a litigant or his attorney which 
might warrant as a sanction an 
award of attorneys' fees to the op-
posing party. 
The general rule followed 
throughout the United States, 
known as the "American rule," 
states that a litigant has no inher-f 
em right to recover attorneys' fees,/ 
whether as costs or as damages,! 
from an opposing litigant, in the 
absence of statute, rule of court, oi 
agreement providing otherwise A 
An exception to the American rule^ 
has been recognized by state 
courts under the circumstances of_ 
obduracy outlined above. 
A few courts have held that ob-
duracy arising in conduct preced-
ing litigation will not support an 
award of attorneys' fees under the 
obduracy exception (S3), reason-
ing that prelitigation conduct giv-
ing rise to a potential cause of 
action or lawsuit rnnnm in itstlf 
constitute obduracyr Many courts/ *?C 
however, have identified 'specific 
conduct by a party which occurred 
prior to the filing of suit as a possi-
ble basis for an award of attorneys' 
fees to the adversary (§4). Courts 
have awarded attorneys' fees to a 
prevailing party based upon a 
showing that the adversary wrong-
fully and in bad faith refused to 
pay a monetary claim, some rjg-
soningthat.litigation SKQUICT have 
beenumSrcessarTjojc^^ 
l l e f t r t ec rTg^ 
were not awardedwnenthe appel-
lor* cTr0fT""~wlnr,1?ioT^)^ a 
proper factual record demonstrat-
ing obduracy (§ 4[a]). Fees were 
not awarded in a case in which an 
opposing party allegedly misallo-
cated municipal funds, because no 
fraudulent purpose for the ac-
couniiD^-^erroTs^ was evident ^ 
(rf lbj) . Obduracy in prelitigation I 
conduct warranting an award of | 
attorneys' fees was not found in a I 
case in which a party failed to 1 
establish legal title to an easement I 
before exercising rights of owner- 1 
ship, because bad faith or opprei- J 
sive and vexatious conduct were 
not shown (S 4fr])t Th™1gh nbrin" 
=*fcey-tras been alleged in cases of 
failure by a government official Co 
enforce statutory rights, state 
courts have not awarded attorneys' 
2. Webster's New Collegiate Dictio-
nary (1976). 
3. The latter term appears in Stech v 
Panel Mart, Inc. (1982. Ind App) 434 
NE2d 97. 14(a)- The others appear 
•32 
with regularity throughout the cases 
collected. 
4. See 1 Spciser, Attorneys' Fees, 
IS 12.3 and 12.4 (1973). 
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fees based upon obduracy under 
either state law (§ 4[d]) or the fed-
eral civil rights statutes (§ 15). 
Mere termination of an employ-
ment contract, absent a showing of 
bad faith, did not constitute suffi-
cient obduracy to allow an award 
of fees to the terminated employee 
(*4[e]). 
State courts addressing the issue 
more often have found obduracy 
warranting imposition of attorneys' 
fees in conduct occurring during 
litigation, as opposed to conduct 
occurring before the litigation pro-
cess begins. Courts have held that 
the obduracy exception is an ap-
propriate remedy to compensate a 
defendant dragged into baseless 
litigation through prosecution of a 
merittess lawsuit, though mere alle-
gations that particular claims were 
meritless or baseless did not suffice 
to justify an award as a sanction 
unless obduracy in presenting the 
claims was also shown (§ 5). Simi-
larly, an award of attorneys' fees 
based on obduracy has been made 
against an attorney who knowingly 
argued entirely meritless defenses, 
but was denied in a case in which a 
party presented an unfounded de-
fense, but was not shown to have 
done so in bad faith (§ 6). Dis-
missal of a condemnation proceed-
ing by the condemnor did not war-
rant an award of fees to the party 
whose properly was threatened 
with condemnation, when the dis-
missal was not made in bad faith 
(I 7). Failure of a plaintiff to dis-
miss a codefendant from a lawsuit, 
when no evidence indicated liabil-
ity by the codefendant for alleged 
negligence to the plaintiff, sup-
ported an award of attorneys' fees 
under the obduracy exception 
(§8). State courts have held that 
^ . n r t R U , 9ZIAJ 
t4th 825 
mere objections to preliminary mo-
tions will not constitute obduracy 
(59), though the cumulative effect 
of a number of objections and mo-
tions resulting in the needless pro-
traction of litigation has been held 
to justify an award of attorneys' 
fees under the obduracy exception 
(S 10). Bad-faith obstruction of a 
series of court orders has been 
sanctioned by an award of attor-
neys' fees under the obduracy ex-
ception (§ 11). The mere fact that 
parties to litigation eventually set-
tled between themselves, when no 
bad faith was evident, did not jus-
tify an award of attorneys' fees 
(§ 12[a]), though a clearly unrea-
sonable and obdurate refusal by an 
attorney to sign a settlement order 
has resulted in an award of fees to 
the opponent (§ 12fbJ). 
The filing of a frivolous appeal 
could constitute obduracy within 
the meaning of the exception to 
the American rule, though state 
courts addressing the question 
have not awarded fees, finding that 
the appeals were not frivolous 
(§ IS). However, an attorney who 
misstated facts in an appellate rec-
ord, thereby consuming the time of 
the court and opposing counsel, 
has been sanctioned by an award 
of fees to the opponent (§ 14). 
A few state courts have explored 
the relationship of the obduracy 
concept to other conceptual bases 
supporting an award of attorneys' 
fees to a prevailing party. The ob-
duracy exception, as utilized by the 
federal courts in making attorneys' 
fees awards made under the fed-
eral civil rights statutes, was held 
not applicable to allow an award of 
fees in state court when state law 
did not allow such awards (§ 15), 
833 
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atnd a s tate court has held that a 
showing of obduracy is unneces-
sary to suppor t an award of attor-
neys ' fees based upon the private 
at torney general exception to the 
American rule (§ 16). 
[bl Prac t ice pointer^— - ^ ^ 
mat ter of broad public pol-
i cy , advocates of shifting at torneys ' 
fees contend that litigants will be 
de ter red from wasting limited jud i -
cial resources and congest ing the 
courts with baseless litigation by 
the threat of having to pay the 
adversary's counsel fees. T h e coun-
terargument states that a litigant 
with a potentially meri torious claim/ 
nx rirftiiBL shuuid not btr PimftKec 
merely tor bnng tng or defending a'~ 
lawsuit, because rights of free ac-
cess to the courts may be chilled.* 
Attorneys arguing for or against 
application of the obduracy excep-
tion to the American rule in a 
particular case might consider di-
recting the court 's at tention to the 
broader underlying policies in-
volved. 
Counsel arguing on appeal that 
an award of attorneys' fees should 
have been allowed by the trial 
court due to obdura te behavior by 
the adversary in the proceedings 
below, or prior to litigation, should 
no te that the decisions state that 
the question of obduracy is a fac-
tual determinat ion. For this reason, 
counsel should preserve the issue 
for appeal and be prepared to 
point to specific trial court findings 
of fact, such as findings that the 
a d v e r s a r y p r o t r a c t e d l i t i g a t i o n , 
abused the judicial process, o r oth-
erwise demonstra ted bad faith giv-
ing rise to obduracy, when assign-
ing trial court refusal to award 
ittorneys* fees as error. T h o u g h 
le appellate court might remand 
>r such a factual determination,9 it 
light instead simply affirm the 
[rial court denial of a t torneys ' 
ees . ' 
Although state courts discussing 
Iobduracy as a basis for an award of at torneys ' fees sometimes have im-
posed such a sanction as part of 
the costs of litigation and some-
t i m e s as damages, as a practical 
matter the courts have a t tempted 
no distinction in categorizing the 
awards on this basis. However, at 
least one court has pointed out 
that because an award of a t torneys ' 
fees as damages made under the 
obduracy exception is punitive in 
nature , an assessment of a t torneys ' 
fees would not be proper against a 
party, such as a government entity, 
which is not liable for punitive 
damages under state law.s 
Counsel should note that courts 
have held an attorney for a party 
personally liable for payment of 
the at torneys ' fees of the opposing 
party, when the court de termined 
that actions taken by the attorney 
in the conduct of litigation consti-
5. See Kuenzel. The Attorney's Fee: 
Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 Iowa 
L Rev 75. 
6. See Upson v Board of Trustees 
(1984) 124 NH 787. 474 A2d 582. 
M M . 
•34 
7. See, for example, Griffin v New 
Hampshire Dept. of Employment Se-
cur. (1977) 117 NH 108. 370 A2d 278. 
* 4(al. 
8. See Re Wardship of Turrin (1982. 
Ind App) 436 NE2d 130. ft 4[a]. 
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luted obduracy.* Obduracy by an 
attorney in bringing or defending a 
lawsuit also could be sanctioned 
under the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct . Disciplinary Rule 
7-102(A)(1) provides that an attor-
ney should not "[flile a suit, assert 
a position, [or] conduct a defense 
. . . on behalf of his client when 
he knows or when it is obvious that 
such action would serve merely to 
harass or maliciously injure an-
o t h e r . " D i sc ip l i na ry R u l e 7-
102(A)(2) ameliorates this rule to 
the extent that a lawyer is allowed 
to make a claim or defense unwar-
ranted by existing law "if it can be 
supported by good faith argument 
for an extension, modification, o r 
reversal of existing law." Clearly, 
however, a trial court finding that 
an attorney obdurately or in bad 
faith presented a baseless claim o r 
defense could warrant professional 
discipline. 
I I . O b d u r a c y in prel i t igat ion 
c o n d u c t 
{ S. View that obdu racy in prel i t i -
gat ion c o n d u c t c a n n o t sup-
po r t award of at torney!* fees 
Although many of the cases col-
lected within this annotat ion make 
no distinction between obdura te 
conduct occurring before the filing 
of suit and obdura te conduct oc-
curring after the filing of suit, the 
follnwinpr rfls*»« h ^ v e JHfl* ^Ep l i r i t l y 
that , o b d j u j ^ ^ c ^ m i u c T ^ o c c u r r i n ^ 
before litigatJQn^ajinc*^ support an 
award of at torneys ' . fees to a party 
under the obdura te behavior ex-
ception T6"thT^Tm»n«nfir rule. 
T h e "obdura te behavior" excep-
9. See, for example, Simmons v 
471 A2d909. 0 6. 
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tion, which would otherwise allow 
an award of at torneys ' fees as an 
element of damages, was held in-
applicable to conduct preceding 
the commencement of litigation in 
E. F. Hut ton 8c Co . v Anderson 
(1979) 42 Co lo App 497. 596 P2d 
413 . T h e plaintiff had been 
awarded punitive damages and at-
torneys ' fees as part of a j u d g m e n t 
in a civil securities fraud lawsuit, in 
which the defendant was alleged to 
have shown a willful, malicious, 
and reckless disregard of the plain-
tiff's rights in paying on an account 
with bad checks. In reviewing the 
defendant 's claim on appeal that 
a t torneys ' fees should not have 
been awarded, the court stated that 
in the absence of a statute or con-
tractual agreement , at torney's fees 
ordinarily are not recoverable as an 
element of damages in a tort o r 
contract action. Noting that the 
plaintiff conceded that no contrac-
tual a r rangement o r statute au tho-
rized the award of at torneys ' fees, 
the court found that the plaintiff 
relied on the "obdura te behavior" 
exception to the general rule of n o 
at torneys ' fees. T h e court de-
scribed the exception as allowing 
the award of a t torneys ' fees if the 
losing party has acted in bad faith 
or for oppressive reasons. Finding, 
however, that the exception ~ap-
plied^qnljLwhen tnT^aH-falth con-
duct anefled" r e l a t e d l c T t h e prose-
cution or .defense " o j ^ ^ - J S 1 1 ' 0 1 1 ' 
and thaTlt waTTi'ot contencled that 
tjje^dcfenjlant haoTTn^aRHiis^cle-
fense IfTlbacL faith, theT court held 
Tjbat i t j v a s ^ e r r o r ^ r _ t h e trial court 
to award ^ t o r J ^ g y ^ T g e s r ^ n H re-
versed the j u d g i t i e n r granting the 
fees. 
lia (1984) 80 Pa Cmwlth 354. 
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In reviewing an award of attor-
neys' fees to a plaintiff who had 
been granted an injunction enjoin-
ing the erection of a fence, the 
court in Kikkert v Krumm (1985, 
Ind) 474 NE2d 503. 49 ALR4th 
819, above, held that intentional 
or illegal conduct that gives rise to 
a cause of action is not obdurate 
behavior within the meaning of the 
exception to the American rule re-
quiring each party to the litigation 
to pay his own attorneys' fees. The 
state Supreme Court first noted 
that attorneys' fees are not allowa-
ble in the absence of a statute or in 
the absence of some agreement or 
stipulation specifically authorizing 
such fees, and noted that the same 
rule applied in courts of law and* 
courts of equity. However, the 
court recognized that other juris-
dictions had carved out an excep-
tion to the general rule through 
the use of the court's equitable 
powers when a party acted in bad 
faith. Stating that the case repre-
sented the first time the court had 
considered the obdurate behavior 
exception to the American rule, the 
court defined the obdurate behav-
ior exception as a protective mea-
sure which operates to help pre-
serve the integrity of the judicial 
process. An attorney's fee award 
made undei' H\e~ 6bduiale"'"uehavipr 
cxegpHonTacfordlflfe to trie court, 
%vU5 puflihVg in" nature ancT^cle-
jlgned"tO ftfiinbufSe" a prevailing 
party wno has"Tj?en draggegUnto 
baseless hngatiQ^JmcT^sraconse-
quence *sTibjectecftogreaTexpense. 
TTnrSUJiiemT? CotTrTatlded Ihafthe 
obduratcjieiiaw^r emepiioll cuille* 
^in+crplayonly at the time a party/ 
files a knowingly baseless claim oy 
The claim is baseless and fails to 
dismiss jt. The court stated that 
conOtjct such as this would consti-
tute obdurate behavior upon a trial 
court's finding that the behavior 
was vexatious and oppressive in 
the extreme andjL^blaianLjUHise 
o£-the~JTroTaai"1^^ * 
the underlying lawsuit as an exam-
ple of the classic property dispute, 
and stating its belief that the plain-
| tiffs and defendants disputed a le-
gitimate claim of right, the court 
found the obdurate behavior ex-
ception, as a remedy for defen-
dants who are draggg^ into i>asc-
' less litigation, k^ippIicable^AJso, 
the**«©«rr,mM«r*Uial If it' "afiegeaiy 
obdurate behavior had occurred 
before the filing o^ 'hf la™*"^ 
~Yj&M IflAT iiiieniioiUl d! illegal con 
duct giving rise to a cause of action 
is not obdurate behavior, but is 
merely conduct that may form thel 
basis of a potential lawsuit. The 
award—of ottorneys?—freT 
plaintiffs was therefore held to be 
error and the judgment was re-
versed in that regard. 
The court in Dotlich v Dotlich 
(1985, Ind App) 475 NE2d 331, 
held that the obdurate behavior 
exception" to ^ne American rule did 
ngtapply " to altSw^gir^rw^rtf^bf 
attorneys'" Fees basea"upon obdu-
rate conduct plgcecIHifg JL Jawsuit. 
The underlying lawsuit was a 
shareholder's derivative action, and 
the directors of a corporation ap-
pealed a court order directing 
them to reimburse the corporation 
for its attorneys' fees. The appel-
late court noted that the jurisdic-
tion generally followed the Ameri-
can rule, prohibiting an award of 
attorneys' fees against a losing 
party, absent a statute or rule to 
the contrary. However, the court 
noted three exceptions to the 
¥* * 
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American rule—the obdurate be-
havior, common fund, and private 
attorney general exceptions. The 
court defined the obdurate behav-
ior situation as one allowing the 
courts to use their equitable pow-
ers to impose costs on defendants 
who behaved in bad faith, and held 
that the obdurate behavior excep-
tion was the only one that conceiv-
ably could apply. Relying upon 
Kikkert v Krumm (1985, Ind) 474 
NE2d 503, above, for the proposi-
tion that the exception provides a 
remedy for defendants dragged 
into baseless litigation, the court 
held that the obdurate behavior 
alleged—refusal of, tne^ corporate 
directors jo^ c Q , ^ g y _ P [ £ P ^ L ^ ^ ^ 
to the cijtrjgorafipn-^ccurrecr be-
fore the suit was iftstitiiTeTfrT6"~was 
not obdj^te^elTaYtoit-^drlwr^he 
meaning^T^tjie Exception". Such 
conduct, according "?&• ine"" court, 
merely formed,the basis of the 
In reviewing a dispute over en-
forcement of a settlement agree-
ment arising out of an eminent 
domain proceeding, the court in 
White v Redevelopment Authority 
of McKeesport (1982) 69 Pa 
Cmwlth 307, 451 A2d 17, held that 
a statute awarding attorneys' fees 
to a party when the other party 
exhibited obdurate conduct during 
the pendency of a suit did noj 
apply to conduct preceding the fil-
ing j>r suiT ^Tne~ local^reaevelbp-
"Vrient authority and the petitioners 
had entered into an agreement 
concerning condemnation of the 
petitioners' business and reim-
bursement for relocation expenses. 
When the redevelopment authority 
made no payments after 2 years, 
the petitioners petitioned the court 
to enforce the settlement, and re-
Ith 825 
quested an additional attorney's 
fee for their efforts expended in 
obtaining payment under the 
agreement. The appellate court 
stated the general rule that in the 
absence of a private agreement or 
statutory provision to the contrary, 
each party to a lawsuit must pay 
his own attorneys' fees. Finding 
that the settlement agreement 
made no mention of the additional 
attorney's fee award sought by the 
petitioners, and that the applicable 
eminent domain code did not au-
thorize such an award, the court 
noted that the petitioners alleged 
that the redevelopment authority 
had been malicious, arbitrary and 
vexatious in delaying payment un-
der the settlement agreement. The 
petitioners, according to the court, 
relied upon a section of the state 
judicial code that entitled a partici-
pant in litigation to receive an at-
torney's fee as a sanction against 
another participant "for dilatory, 
obdurate or vexatious conduct dur-
ing the pendency of a matter." The 
court held that the conduct of"the 
tion" jfosglyiTri _V^peTT^to the 
settlemem^gre^menTtliini^ tfJeTpe-
titioners^Jiled Tfieir petition. Also, 
trie couTPrTtft^cTtrrai delay in mak-
ing payment under the agreement 
was not "dilatory, obdurate or vex-
atious conduct" relative to the un-
derlying eminent domain proceed-
ings. Stating that it could "by no 
means applaud the Authority's con-
duct relative to its agreement," the 
court held that nevertheless an 
award of attorneys' fees could not 
be made under the state statute, so 
837 
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the trial court order denying relief 
was affirmed. 
$ 4. View that obduracy in preliti-
gation conduct can support 
award of attorneys' fees 
[a] Refusing to pay monetary 
claim 
In (he following cases, prcftciga-
tion refusal by a party to pay a 
monetary claim was held by the 
courts to constitute obdurate be-
havior such as would support an 
award of attorneys' fees made un-
der the obduracy exception. 
In reviewing an award o f attor-
neys' fees made under the obdu-
rate behavior exception, the cour> 
in Lystarczyk v Smits (1982, Ind 
App) 435 NE2d 1011, held that the 
jury reasonably could have deter-
mined that the defendant had prac-
ticed oppression, fraud, or bad 
faith in refusing to make payment 
under a contract, thereby justifying 
the award. The underlying suit 
arose from breach of a construc-
tion contract for construction of a 
house. After a jury verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff contractor, the de-
fendant appealed the award of 
damages and attorneys' fees. Stat-
ing that the jury was charged with 
weighing the evidence and deter-
mining the credibility of witnesses, 
and viewing the evidence and rea-
sonable inferences to be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable 
to the defendant, the court found 
that the jury could reasonably have 
inferred that the defendant, in bad 
faith, attempted to delay payment 
10. More recent Indiana decisions 
indicate that the jurisdiction will no 
longer recognize prelitigation conduct 
as a basis tor an award of attorneys' 
fees under the obduracy exception. See 
IE. TEE AWAKU4 IJJ ni~.IVtUI 
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to and withheld payment from the 
plaintiff. The court noted the gen-
eral rule that each party to the 
litigation pays his own counsel 
fees, and the obdurate behavior 
exception, under which the court 
uses its equitable powers to impose 
costs on a defendant who has be-
haved in bad faith. However, find-
ing that the proper amount of at-
torneys' fees to be awarded was 
not supported by sufficient evk, 
dencc, the court reversed wMxip' 
rnanded.1* ^ 0 
In reviewing a lawsuit/brought 
by a city employee t? recover 
wages, the court in Logansport v 
Remley (1983, Ind App) 453 NE2d 
326, held that failure of the city to 
pay an employee compensatory 
time was properly determined by 
the trial court to constitute obdu-
rate behavior, and such behavior 
warranted an award of attorneys' 
fees to the employee. According to 
the court, testimony at the trial 
showed that the employee was dis-
missed by the city in order to avoid 
having to pay her compensatory 
time wages. Although the court 
noted that the evidence was con-
flicting as to whether the employee 
left her employment voluntarily or 
was fired, it held that the trial 
court, as a finder of fact, had made 
the inference that she was fired, 
and would not be reversed on this 
factual determination. Further, the 
court stated that it believed the 
conduct of city officials clearly con-
stituted obdurate behavior. The 
court found that the employee was 
Kikkcrt v Krumm (1985. Ind) 474 
NE2d 503, 49 ALR4th 819, and Dot-
lich v Dotlich (1985. Ind App) 475 
NE2d33! ,bothat$3 . 
• M 
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fired after city officials discovered 
that she accumulated more com-
pensatory time hours than they had 
previously contemplated, and ap-
parently decided that the only ex-
pedient solution was to fire her. 
The court stated that it would not 
sanction conduct which amounted 
to an attempt by the city to alter 
the terms of a contract. Character-
izing the award of attorneys' fees 
under the obdurate behavior ex-
ception as a "punitive; imposition," 
the court held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to attorneys' fees under 
the obdurate behavior exception, 
and affirmed.11 
The state Supreme Court in 
Harkeem v Adams (1977) 117 N H 
687. 377 A2d 617, e x p l i c j t i v e i t 
dorsed an award of aTTorne^s fees 
to ;T prevluTuiF^partv^rjaseiri on Hi« 
played oj^dl^Sy^gLih^ othe?r party 
in^reimKatibn^onduct. 1 he plain-
lif l irrthe original suit had sought 
unemployment compensation ben-
efits from the state department of 
employment security, and his bene-
fits were denied. The plaintiff re-
peatedly attempted to claim his 
benefits by various administrative 
avenues, but was unsuccessful. A 
trial court eventually awarded the 
plaintiff the benefits he sought, and 
additionally awarded counsel fees 
in the amount of one-third of the 
recovery. On appeal, the defendant 
contended that the court could not 
award attorneys* fees in a case of 
bad-faith conduct, and that even if 
it could, the finding of bad faith 
was not properly made. The court 
stated the general rule that parties 
to litigation pay their own counsel 
fees, and reasoned that the rule 
sought to avoid penalizing a per-
son for merely defending or prose-
cuting a lawsuit by entitling the 
opponent to collect attorneys' fees. 
Also, the court stated that the 
threat of having to pay an oppo-
nent's costs might unjustly deter 
those of limited resources from 
prosecuting or defending suits. 
Overriding considerations, how-
ever, would allow an award of at-
torneys' fees if appropriate to do 
justice and vindicate rights, accord-
ing to the court. Citing numerous 
authorities, the court defined the 
bad-faith conduct necessary to jus-
tify an award of attorneys' fees as 
including situations in which a 
party has acted "in bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
reasons," conduct characterized as 
unreasonably obdurate or obsti-
nate, or cases in which it should 
have Been jinn^e^sary~tor~lrie"suc-
cessful^^q^To^hav^b'rougnt the 
j c t i o n . The"^a)u7rHuYrtKet noted 
thai an^ward of attorne 
the basisjaLbad •fratflTwas appropri 
i aj^ttTcases in which an individual was forced to seek judicial assis-tance to secure a clearly defined and established right, which should have been freely enjoyed without judicial intervention. Under thts^TS^ nCT 
11. The court defined the nliilm iij__ dwfnlTTfis i iinln in that the juris-
behavior required to bring the obdu- diction will no longer recognize preliti-
rate behavior exception into play as gation conduct as a basis for an award 
conduct of a party which is "vexatious , of attorneys' fees under the obduracy 
and oppressive in the extreme," citing exception. Sec Kikkert v Krumm (1985, 
St. Joseph's College v Morrison, Inc. "ind) 474 NE2d 503, 49 AUUth 819, 
(1973) 158 Ind App 272, 302 NE2d and Dotlich v Dotlich (1985. Ind App) 
865, below. J lowvtr , -niurr recent"lnr-"~475 NE2d 331. both at ft 3. 
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ment compensation actions, where 
an individual is often of limited 
means, the court held that an at-
torney's fee award would further 
the policy of providing needed ac-
cess to the courts. Concluding that 
the plaintiff was clearly entitled to 
unemployment benefits, but was 
able to obtain them only by dili-
gently pnry»it)g hi* rlaim "through 
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a mechanic's lien, the court in St 
>t wnat snouia nave ucm an Joseph's College v Morrison, Inc. 
?H^j^^yr^cc^m^€ (1973) 158 Ind App 272, 302 
shi t teyTo^fee^^^gsJDle NE2d 865, held that conduct by a 
party must be "vexatious and op-
pressive in the extreme" before the 
court would award attorneys' fees 
under the obdurate behavior ex-
ception, and that this standard had 
not been met in the case before it. 
A contractor sought to recover at-
torneys* fees under the slate me-
chanic's lien statute, but the court 
held that the statute did not apply 
to one not entitled to foreclose a 
mechanic's lien. Stating the general 
[ule of the jurisdiction that each 
my to a lawsuit must pay his own 
cbunsel fees, that an award of at-
torneys' fees could not be made in 
ie absence of a statute or agree* 
.lent, and that this rule applied 
qually in courts of law and courts 
->f equity, the court noted excep-
tions which had been carved out. 
The court found the exception ap-
plicable to the situation before it to 
be the obdurate behavior excep-
tion, under which courts could use 
their equitable powers to impose 
costs on defendants who behaved 
in bad faith. Holding that__exyaor-
dinary circumstances other than 
me/e^aTTur^'To^-l^ 
claim were_necessafy"jo establish 
baa taitn uruIeT the" obdurate be* 
^*n j "available legal channel before 
he obtained vindication," the court 
held that the department of em-
ployment security acted contrary to 
both statute and established case 
law, which clearly established the 
plaintifTs claim as legitimate, in 
requiring the plaintiff to pursue 
litigation before paying his claims. 
Determining that the department 
had no valid reason for denying 
the plaintifTs benefitn, thr royrr 
Uetr-mai the department, in its 
jduratc pursuit of further fruit-
less litigation, "showed a callous 
d^rcgard^JQgrtfie^tgEjg of the 
p|anuin/^an3 that as a result, a 
needlesTctrain was placed upon the 
resources of the slate judicial sys-
tem. The award of attorneys* fees 
against the department was af-
firmed. 
• 
Alleged prelitigation refusal by a 
party to pay a monetary claim was 
held, in the following cases, not 
sufficiently proven lo constitute ob-
durate behavior such as would sup-
port an award of attorneys' fees 
under the obduracy exception. 
In reviewing an action to enforce 
Daa iaun uuuci mc uuuuiaiv
 v« 
"havT75Tre*geption,( and t'KafT^arty's 
conduct musT^oT>^v^xaTious and 
6m5FeiSIve"Tr^^ 
THtable sanTuonsT^He^court held 
frlaTl-qulTylficI noTjustify an award 
of counsel fees in the case before 
it, so reversed the trial court on 
this ground. However, the court 
noted that if a determination on 
remand showed that a valid lien 
o 
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existed, a statutory award of attor- each party must pay his own attor-
neys' fees would be appropriate. , , neys' fees in the absence of a stat-
Finding that .he trial court had " J : W W " 1 " ' o r »»P u ' a t i o n P r o" 
not abused its discretion in deny- v , d ' " « «>'henv,.e and that an ex-
:«« ^ *.ui«. r~-
 a»»^raM..* r-*- ..« ception to the rule existed when a 
mg a claim tor attorneys tees un- r . , . . ,
 f . . u 
AH »U- ~K,I . .~ . . - u-i* :~- -.„,. party acted in bad faith. However, 
der the obdurate behavior excep- K J . J c ^ »*w ^ r •.•.*• 
tion. the court in Stech v Penal t h e «>"« d e ? n e d b a d f a '«h . " 
Mart. Inc. (1982, Ind App) 434 5 o n d u c l vexat.ous and oppress.ve 
NE2d 97. held thatjt could not be , n , h .e e x , r e m e - l"'\co"n findm«s 
—:A «- ^ '^o' t^; Zr iZr^iU^ »•£„ on the issue of bad faith were pre-
said as a matter ol law that the , , , ..r 
piainTto5igo5i|™3ns5iSi-«° lu"!Id " ^ T " a n d TH "ol 
p V l c H r ^ T s l a l e ^ e r a c t ^ *? disturbed .f supported by ev.-
a^Ttemsi^rrmhm^Skged d e n c e °.f probative value. Because 
i r b a T T a T a r ^ t T T V l c r ^ e i h e * * , n a l co"f« . h a d ™****" 
6Wurate b ^ j g o t e x c ^ i o T r o p e r - ™ d ™ c e a n d >"*««* l*!e ^d .b . luy 
a t e . The w S e r i y ^ T u T T ^ r t s e o f , h e " " " " » " • a " d <h< ' " " " 
"^Een—The plaintiff corporation p r i n t e d were complex, the court 
sought to purchase shares of stock. , f o u 1 , d n o a b u 5 r c °f d « c r « ' ° " » t h e 
under a stock purchase agreement. «™1 court refusal to award attor-
and the defendant refused to sell " 'vs fee,, a n d h ' l d « h a ' " ? « « -
the stock at the tendered price, « " of law, .1 could not be sa.d that 
The corporation then filed a de- »hf corporat.on had ac .ed .n bad 
claratory judgment action. The fe.th dunng the d.spute. The case 
court defined the only relevant is- w a» a f f i 7 " e d " P " * - r e v e r s e d , n 
sue on appeal as whether the de- P a r t - a n d «•»**»««•" 
fendant should have been awarded A trial court award of attorneys' 
attorneys* fees due to the obdurate fees assessed under the obduracy 
behavior of the corporation in re- theory against a state public wel-
fusing to pay sums owed to her fare department was reversed by 
and to the estate, the salary and the court in Re Wardship of Turrin 
bonus accrued by the deceased (1982, Ind App) 436 NE2d 130, 
prior to his death. Stating that the because the court_determined as a 
trial court found on the evidence matter of fact thalLthe^eparTment 
no unreasonable delay giving rise ha j ^ n o j ^ d ragged jos te rparen t s 
to "obs t reperousness" which into baseless" ntigatioriTiTrefusing 
would call for an award of attor- to pay monetary amounts incurred 
neys' fees or punitive damages, the jnJ«uinj£To^^ The 
court noted the general rule that foster ^areruT of" a ^ cHilcf afflicted 
12. More recent Indi na decisi ns 
indicate that the jurisdiction will no 
longer recognize prelitigation conduct 
as a basis for an award of attorneys' 
fees under the obduracy exception. See 
Kikkert v Krumm (1985, Ind) 474 
NE2d 503, 49 ALR4th 819, and Dot-
lich v Dotlich (1985, Ind App) 475 
NE2d331,bothat§3. 
13. More recent Indiana de isions
i dicate that the jurisdiction will no
l nger recognize prelitigation conduct 
as a basis for an award of attorneys' 
fees under the obduracy exception. See 
Kikkert v Krumm (1985, Ind) 474 
NE2d 503, 49 ALR4th 819, and Dot-
lich v Dotlich (1985, Ind App) 475 
NE2d3Sl.bothat ( 3 . 
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with cyscic fibrosis petitioned the 
state for reimbursement of various 
monetary amounts incurred as ex-
penses in foster care. As part of 
the petition, the foster parents 
sought reimbursement of their at-
torneys' fees, and the fees were 
awarded against the welfare de-
partment. Finding that no portion 
of the applicable dependent chil-
dren statute granted attorneys* fees 
to foster parents, and finding no 
agreement between the parties 
providing for attorneys' fees, the 
court cited Cox v Ubik (1981, Ind 
App) 424 NE2d 127. 5 8. for rec-
ognition of the obdurate behavior 
exception to the general rule that 
no attorneys* fees could be 
awarded absent statute or agree-
ment. This exception, according to 
the court, was based on bad-faith 
actions by a party which were ''vex-
atious and oppressive in the ex-
treme." Noting that the bad faith 
original demand for compensation 
from the welfare department and 
that the court had denied their 
request for other expenses, and 
these denials were not challenged 
on appeal. Concluding that the 
welfare department's initial denial 
of the claims for reimbursement 
had merit and so was not baseless, 
the court determined that the ob-
durate behavior exception did not 
apply.14 
In reviewing an action disputing 
entitlement to unemployment com-
pensation benefits, the court in 
Griffin v New Hampshire Dept. of 
Employment Secure. (1977) 117 
NH 108, 370 A2d 278, held that 
absent a finjjingL^ajjhedejendant 
3eme<ri>ei^ 
neys^eeTjvould JQI j*^j*yd e d l o 
tfuTjnsyntjin^ 
exception. The plaintiFTs unem-
benefits 
wej^rtne 
_ _ j u o n : J [ h e lai tiH 
ployment compensation 
were discontinued by the state, and 
he appealed. The trial court found 
that the plaintiff was entitled to the 
benefits, and awarded the plaintiff 
attorneys' fees to be paid by the 
stale department of employment 
security, reasoning that an unem-
ployed worker should not have to 
pay attorneys' fees in order to se-
cure unemployment compensation 
to which he is entitled under law. 
Amici curiae to the appeal en-
dorsed this argument, and also ar-
gued that the trial court possessed 
the equitable power to award attor-
14. The court also held that because 
an award of attorneys' fees made on 
the basis of the obdurate behavior ex-
ception was punitive in nature, and the 
welfare department was a governmen-
tal entity, attorneys' fees, as punitive 
damages, could not be assessed, under 
the reasoning of State v Denny (1980) 
273 Ind 556. 406 NE2d 240. Also, as 
noted above, more recent Indiana deci-
sions state that obduracy giving rise to 
an award of attorneys' fees cannot be 
based upon prelitigation conduct. See 
Kikkert v Krumm (19$*, Ind) 474 
NE2d 503. 49 ALR4th 819. and Dol-
hch v Dotlich (1985, Ind App) 475 
NE2d331,bothat J 3. 
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neys' fees to put the innocent party 
in the same position in which he 
would have stood but for the other 
party's misconduct, and to discour-
age repetition of obdurate or bad-
faith conduct by the other party. 
Finding no statutory authority for 
the payment of attorneys' fees to 
the plaintiff, the court stated that 
bad faith or obstinacy on the part 
of a party, manifested by its acting 
"vexatiously, wantonly, or for op-
pressive reasons," had been recog-
nized as an exception to the gen-
eral rule that attorneys' fees ordi-
narily would not be recoverable by 
the prevailing party. Noting a trial 
court finding that the employment 
department had^"ScgngfuHy with-
fiejd" benefits jxomi the plaintiff, 
the c o u j ^ 3 ^ ^ ^ ^ Q ^ ^ e n c e t n a t 
tne^cle^artment liad acte? in bad 
faith or that Its concTuct was "un-
The court "cioncluaecnihaT without 
such a finding of bad faith it need 
not decide whether bad faith would 
be recognized as an exception to 
the general rule that the parties to 
a lawsuit pay their own counsel 
fees, and that it would not define 
what conduct would constitute bad 
faith on the part of the employ-
ment compensation department if 
such an exception was recog-
nized." 
Voiding as a matter of law that 
no showing of obduracy sufficient 
to justify an award of attorneys' 
fees had been made, the court in 
Upson v Board of Trustees (1984) 
124 NH 787, 474 A2d 582. held 
that no attorneys' fees should be 
awarded against a state agency that 
refused to pay retirement benefits. 
The underlying action involved the 
plaintiff's entitlement to a disability 
retirement. After holding that the 
plaintiff was entitled to these bene-
fits, the court examined whether 
the plaintiff should be awarded 
costs and attorneys' fees due to the 
defendant's conduct in refusing to 
accept his application. Citing Har-
keem v Adams (1977rTl7 NH 
6o"7, Mi Aiid 617, above, jhe court 
stated that an award gj^attorneys? 
lees on the basls~~oTlbac! iaith was 
appropriate when;nrgpryiau^rwas 
forced to seek ju&Toattssistance to 
secure a ^ leaxl^delined and estab-
jJJB^rcSPjft1' ffiflfrevejfl the court 
field that in the casebefore it, the 
defendant's conduct could not be 
characterized as unreasonably ob-
durate or obstinate. The court ad-
ditionally distinguished 7 Harkeem 
by ndtinjf fJiai_lh<Tllefendani in this 
case h a d j Q t jmnexessarjly jn-
"cj-eas^ edtKe^  pja7ntin*w<7sts3by *"e 
use^ bt^ilatpry^tactiTs. Vhereiore, 
the^~coun Field that it was pre-
cluded from finding bad faith suffi-
cient to justify an award of attor-
neys' fees as a matter of law, but 
remanded for a factual determina-
tion on the issue. 
See State ex rel. Murphy v In-
dustrial Com. of Ohio (1980) 61 
Ohio St 2d 312. 15 Ohio Ops 3d 
386, 401 NE2d 923, in which the 
court held that the party claiming 
attorneys' fees under the obduracy 
exception had not met his burden 
of proof in establishing any im-
proper action by a state commis-
15. The state supreme later held that 
similar conduct by a state agency could 
properly support an award of attor-
neys' fees under the obduracy excep-
tion. See Harkeem v Adams (1977) 117 
NH 687. 377 A2d 617. above. 
843 
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sion. The state industrial commis-
sion had refused to consider an 
appeal denying workers' compensa-
tion benefits to the appellant. The 
Court of Appeals issued a writ of 
mandamus ordering the commis-
sion to reconsider allowing the ap-
peal, and the appellant sought by 
motion an order granting attor-
neys' fees for the mandamus pro-
ceeding. The motion was overruled 
by the Court of Appeals. The state 
Supreme Court first noted the gen-
eral rule that attorneys' fees were 
not recoverable as part of the costs 
of litigation in the absence of statu-
tory authorization. The court fur-
ther noted, without deciding, that 
the appellant attempted to recover 
attorneys' fees because the manda-
mus action was necessitated by 
"bad faith, vexatious, wanton, ob-
durate or oppressive" actions by 
the commission. Holding that the 
appellant had not borne of his bur-
den of proof, the court refused to 
decide whether such actions, if 
proven, would result in an award 
of attorneys' fees. The judgment 
was therefore affirmed. 
[bj MUallocating funds 
Under the particular facts of the 
following case, prelitigation con-
duct which consisted of misallocat-
ing municipal funds was deemed 
not fraudulent in purpose, so in-
sufficient to support an award of 
attorneys' fees to the plaintiff un-
der the obduracy exception. 
Finding no evidence in the rec-
ord that the defendant had acted in 
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, 
obdurately or for oppressive rea-
sons in misallocating municipal 
funds, the court in Oakwood v 
Makar (1983, Cuyahoga Co) 11 
Ohio App 3d 46. 11 Ohio BR 79, 
463 NE2d 61, held that an award 
of attorneys' fees under the obdu-
rate behavior exception was unwar-
ranted. The underlying action 
arose when a state auditor discov-
ered discrepancies in the account-
ing books of a municipality. The 
responsible financial clerk was sued 
by the municipality for the financial 
deficiencies discovered, and the 
plaintiff municipality was awarded 
damages and attorneys' fees by the 
trial court, which the defendant 
appealed. The defendant con-
tended that in the absence of statu-
tory authorization, attorneys' fees 
could be awarded only when puni-
tive damages were also awarded. 
The court stated that the current 
rule of the jurisdiction, as ex-
pressed in Sorin v Board of Educa-
tion (1976) 46 Ohio St 2d 177, 75 
Ohio Ops 2d 224, 347 NE2d 527, 
§ 4(c], allowed the prevailing party 
attorneys' fees if the other party 
was found to have acted in bad 
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, obdu-
rately, or for oppressive reasons. 
Although punitive damages often 
were awarded when these condi-
tions existed, the court found no 
precedent stating that an award of 
punitive damages must be made 
prior to an award of attorneys' 
fees. However, the court held that 
no express finding had been made 
showing that the defendant acted 
in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, 
obdurately, or for oppressive rea-
sons. Viewing the evidence at 
showing an informal system of 
bookkeeping had existed in the 
municipality, and that no formal 
accounting procedure had been set 
up, the court concluded that the 
defendant could be shown to have 
no fraudulent purposes in misallo-
49 ALR4th 825 
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eating the municipal funds. There-
fore, the court found the award of 
attorneys' fees unwarranted, and 
reversed. 
See Re Estate of Pitone (1982) 
297 Pa Super 161, 443 A2d 349, in 
which the appellate court did not 
reach the arguments of the appel-
lees that they should be awarded 
reasonable counsel fees as part of 
taxable costs, because the appellant 
was obdurate in misusing estate 
funds. The appeal arose after a 
petition for reconsideration was 
denied by the Orphans' Court. Af-
ter affirming the lower court de-
nial, the court noted in a footnote 
that the appellees requested an 
award of reasonable counsel fees 
as part of taxable costs under a 
state statute allowing such fees as a 
sanction against another partici-
pant for dilatory, obdurate, or vex-
atious conduct during the pen-
dency of the matter. According to 
the court, the appellees claimed 
that the appellant had improperly 
used funds of an estate in various 
ways. Without discussion, the court 
held that the claim for attorneys' 
fees had been waived because the 
appellees failed to preserve it in 
the lowej 
tJ Failing to establish legal right 
to property before assuming 
ownership 
^ndeTTnTljarilCUlar lacts of The 
following case, the court held that 
prelitigation conduct consisting of 
a failure to establish legal rights to 
property before assuming an 
utes of ownership over it cjfa n< 
constitute pfrjiirary *t\c,l\ ar-
rant an award of attorneys' fees 
under uie^*obduracy exegption^to 
Sic American rule! 
Premature usage of a prescrip-
tive easement by a party was held 
not the type of obdurate behavior 
or bad faith required to award at-
torneys' fees under the obdurate 
behavior exception in Umbreit v 
Chester B. Stem, Inc. (1978) 176 
Ind App 53, 373 NE2d 1116. The 
defendants claimed to have ac-
quired a prescriptive easement 
over land belonging to the plain-
tiff, and the plaintiff sought dam-
ages for trespass and an injunction. 
The trial court granted the injunc-
tion, and awarded attorneys' fees 
to the plaintiff. The appellate 
court, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the defen-
dants, found that the defendants 
had not adequately established the 
exact location of their alleged pre-
scriptive easement, nor had they 
identified their predecessors-in-title 
under whom they claimed continu-
ous use, and that the evidence was 
conflicting as to the existence of a 
road across the plaintiffs' property 
at an earlier time. The court held 
that the evidence showed that the 
defendants therefore had failed to 
meet their burden of proving a 
prescriptive easement across the 
plaintiff's property before begin-
ning bulldozing activities upon it. 
Turning to the question of the 
award of attorneys' fees, the court 
Jirst noted the general rule of the 
jurisdiction that each party paid his 
own counsel fees, in the absence of 
a statute or agreement or stipula-
tion stating otherwise. The court 
listed limited exceptions to the 
general rule, including the obdu-
rate behavior exception, which the 
court defined as involving the use 
of the equitable powers of the 
courts to impose costs on defen-
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dants who behaved in bad faith.1* 
'An indicator to the appellate court 
ftfff "fhe oCduralF behavior excep-
tion mignT a^piyTygaTjh> language 
<>f uie tiiaj^^^juo^mentTsiLating 
tKSff rhT'^o!gfendants had acted 
"without any "CPTSTOI" titje/' that 
tfie1T*'acts werTj^Shbclciny^to the 
conscience ol IthelCoun and evi-
denced a reckless TcTisriegard _of the 
consequences,1' and that attorneys' 
tcc^f j i i j £ U Warded as a result, 
roweveiv} the appellate court 
staretHttat such language is associ-
L atcjJU-wdjh tn^^avTam^o^&unitivV^ 
'fry^,^atnage^ not^with an awa"rd of 
3^ a^WrneyJ) kec0 Noting IKat the 
phwhtiffnacrTieither requested at-
torneys' fees in his complaint nor 
alluded to them in trial briefs, the 
court died St. Joseph's College v 
Morrison, Inc. (1973) 158 Ind App 
272. 302 NE2d 865, * 4[a], for the 
proposition that a party's conduct 
must be vexatious and oppressive 
in the extreme before attorneys' 
fees could be awarded. The court 
held that although, thc"~cyidcncc 
showed that the_dejencTants had 
hot yet " j^p^njeQ^goodl title*To"~the 
prescriptive e^se^eliPttrjpestion 
wnen they be^aTT t^lTTHozingrThey 
n*ad entered a pjrftn'nj^jpurcnase 
agreement with the "prior owner of 
the easement before taking their 
actionX~lmcT~ffad been assured by 
the prior owner that the alleged 
easement was a means of ingress 
and egress from the real estate. 
The court also noted that the deed 
executed following the purchase 
purported to include an easement 
along the roadway. Holding that 
the defendants might have acted 
prematurely and with undue haste, 
but that their actions did not rise 
to the level of obdurate behavior 
or bad faith required by the St. 
Joseph's College Case, the court 
found no justification for awarding 
attorneys* fees to the plaintiff. The 
judgment awarding attorneys' fees 
was therefore reversed and the 
case remanded." 
[dj Refusing to enforce sUtutory 
rights 
Allegations that prelitigation ob-
duracy look the form/of govern-
mental refusals to enforce statutory 
rights were not successful in the 
following cases, in which the courts 
denied recovery of attorneys* fees 
requested under the obduracy the-
ory.1* 
A request for an award of attor-
neys' fees made under the theory 
16. The court also denned the com-
mon fund exception as a defensive use 
of the equitable powers of the courts 
to ensure that the beneficiaries of liti-
gation share the expense to prevent 
the unjust enrichment of "free riders," 
and denned the private attorney gen-
eral exception as an offensive use of 
the equitable powers of the courts to 
ensure that a strong congressional pol-
icy was effectuated. However, the court 
found that neither the common fund 
nor the private attorney general excep-
tion applied to the case before it. 
17. More recent Indiana decisions 
indicate that the jurisdiction will no 
longer recognize prelitigation conduct 
as a basis for an award of attorneys' 
fees under the obduracy exception. See 
Kikkert v Krumm (1985. Ind) 474 
NE2d 503. 49 ALR4th 819, and Dot-
hch v Dotlich (1985. Ind App) 475 
NE2d331.bothat§3. 
18. For cases in which government 
refusal to pay a monetary claim was 
contended to constitute a basis for an 
award of attorneys' fees under the ob-
duracy exception, see 4 4(a). 
49 AU 
that a state official obdurately had 
refused to enforce statutory rights 
was denied without discussion in 
Scott v Family Ministries (1976, 2d 
Dist) 65 C»J App 3d 492, 135 Cal 
Rptr 430. The original action 
sought to restrain religious match-
ing in adoption procedures as 
practiced by a private state-licensed 
adoption agency. After a judgment 
restraining the procedures denied 
attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs, 
they appealed, arguing in part that 
the "obdurate attitude" of the state 
attorney general in failing to pro-
tect the rights of adopted children 
entitled them to an award of fees. 
The court noted that the same 
issue was currently on appeal be-
fore the state Supreme Court, and 
that therefore it ordinarily would 
not pass on the issue until the 
Supreme Court had spoken, stating 
that extended discussion would be 
presumptuous. However, the court 
held that attorneys' fees historically 
had not been awarded in such situ-
ations, so affirmed the trial court 
denial of fees. 
The obdurate behavior theory 
for an award of attorneys' fees as a 
sanction for refusal by school dis-
tricts to allow the exercise of statu-
tory rights was held to involve a 
factual determination of bad faith 
properly resolved by the trial court 
in Denver Asso. for Retarded Chil-
dren, Inc. v School Dist. (1975) 
188 Colo 310, 535 P2d 200. The 
underlying action, a mandamus, 
sought to have school districts 
comply with a statute concerning 
funding for the training of retarded 
^ ^ N 
19. A later Colorado decision takes 
the position that obduracy relates to 
the prosecution or defense of an ac-
tion, and not to prelitigation conduct. 
4th 825 
and handicapped persons. On 
cross appeal, the plaintiffs con-
tended that the District Court 
should have awarded them attor-
neys' fees. The court first noted 
that the issue of the awarding of 
attorneys' fees was a pure question 
of law, which could be decided on 
appeal by the appellate court. 
However, the court rejected the 
plaintiffs' claim that the defendants 
had acted obdurately and in bad 
faith in not complying with the 
state statute, stating that this the-
ory involved a factual determina-
tion of bad faith. Because the 
plaintiffs had not moved for a new 
trial on this factual issue, the ap-
pellate court held that the issue 
was not properly before it. The 
district court's order denying attor-
neys' fees was affirmed." 
An award of attorneys' fees as 
exemplary damages was held not a 
possible recovery for a purported 
violation of federal and state stat-
utes in Silverstein v Sisters of 
Charity of Leavenworth Health 
Services Corp. (1976) 38 Colo App 
286, 559 P2d 716, 14 BNA FEP 
Cas 1066, 13 CCH EPD 1 11500. 
The plaintiff alleged employment 
discrimination based on her handi-
cap against the defendant. The 
plaintiff* also requested attorneys' 
fees as a general prayer in the 
complaint. The trial court ordered 
the dismissal of the statutory 
claims and struck prayers for exem-
plary damages and fees. On ap-
peal, the plaintiff conceded that 
attorneys' fees generally were not 
recoverable as an item of damages 
.See E. F. Hutton & Co. v Anderson 
YI979) 42 Colo App 497. 596 P2d 413, 
847 
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in the absence of express contrac-
tual or statutory liability. However, 
she contended that her claim fell 
within either the private attorney 
general or obdurate behavior ex-
ception to that rule. After rejecting 
recovery under the private attorney 
general rationale, the court defined 
the obdurate behavior doctrine as 
including situations in which the 
losing party is shown to have acted 
in bad faith or for oppressive rea-
sons. The court stated that a re-
lated concept allowed an award of 
attorneys' fees as exemplary dam-
ages to punish behavior of an ag-
gravated nature. However, because 
it determined that no exemplary 
damages could be recovered for a 
purported violation of the federal 
and state discrimination statutes, 
the court refused to award fees 
under the obdurate behavior ex-
ception." 
The court in State ex rel. Gros-
ser v Boy (1976) 46 Ohio St 2d 
184, 347 NE2d 539. held that the 
obdurate behavior exception to the 
American rule would not apply to 
sanction a party for refusing to 
allow the exercise of a nght 
granted by state law. In the under-
lying action, the petitioners sought 
a writ of mandamus under which 
they would be allowed to inspect 
copies of high school records pur-
suant to a state statute. The peti-
tioners eventually prevailed and 
sought, by motion in the Court of 
Appeals, an order awarding them 
costs and expenses, including rea-
sonable attorneys' fees. The Su-
preme Court found no express 
provision for the recovery of attor-
20. As noted above, the Colorado 
view has been modified since the dale 
of this case. See E. F. Hutton & Co. v 
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neys' fees under applicable state 
statutes, and stated the general 
rule of the jurisdiction that in the 
absence of a statutory provision 
making attorneys' fees a part of 
costs, such fees could not be taxed. 
However, the court noted that the 
petitioners relied upon Sorin v 
Board of Education (1976) 46 
Ohio St 2d 177. 347 NE2d 527, 
§ 4(e], above, which allowed an 
award of attorneys' fees to be 
made when the opposing party has 
demonstrated bad faith or vexa-
tious, wanton, obdurate, or oppres-
sive conduct. Stating without dis-
cussion that this exception was not 
applicable to the case before it, the 
court affirmed the denial of an 
award of attorneys' fees. 
[e] Terminating contract 
Under the particular facts of the 
following case, the court deter-
mined that prelitigation conduct 
consisting of the termination of a 
school superintendent's contract by 
a school board would not give rise 
to an award of attorneys' fees to 
the superintendent, when the rec-
ord reflected no bad faith by the 
school board in terminating the 
contract. 
The obdurate behavior exception 
to the American rule was held not 
applicable to award attorneys' fees 
incurred by a school superinten-
dent during an administrative pro-
ceeding he brought after a school 
board suspended his contract, be-
cause the school board was not 
shown to have acted in bad faith in 
seeking to terminate the superin-
tendent's contract, in Sorin v 
Anderson (1979) 42 Colo App 497, 
596P2d413, J 3. 
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Board of Education (1976) 46 
Ohio St 2d 177, 347 NE2d 527. 
After the school board asked the 
superintendent to resign, brought 
charges against him, and then sus-
pended him, the school superinten-
dent demanded a public hearing 
under the relevant state statute. 
The school board terminated his 
contract retroactive to the date of 
his suspension after the hearing, 
and the Court of Common Pleas, 
on appeal, awarded the superinten-
dent his full salary and contract 
benefits for the suspension period. 
The superintendent then sought 
repayment of attorneys' fees in-
curred during the hearing, and the 
trial court awarded attorneys' fees 
as costs and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. The state Supreme Court 
first noted that the American rule 
did not permit a prevailing party to 
recover attorneys' fees, in the ab-
sence of statutory authorization, as 
part of the costs of litigation. Re-
cognizing that commentators had 
criticized the American rule in re-
cent years, the court stated that 
any departure from the rule, which 
it viewed as a deeply ridden policy, 
was a matter of legislative concern. 
Finding no applicable statutory 
provision providing expressly for 
the recovery of attorneys' fees as 
part of the costs of litigation, and 
refusing to read such an award into 
a statute governing termination of 
contracts with teachers, the court 
examined the obduracy exception 
to the American rule. This excep-
tion, according to the court, would 
21. More recent Ohio Supreme 
Court decisions have tended to refer to 
the exception merely as the "bad faith" 
exception, without mentioning the spe-
cific terms "obduracy" or "obdurate 
behavior." See, for example. State ex 
grant an award of attorneys' fees to 
a party in actions in which the 
opposing party acted in bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly, obdurately, 
or for oppressive reasons." The 
court found that precedent within 
the jurisdiction allowed a jury to 
consider and include reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred by the 
plaintiff as a part of compensatory 
damages in tort actions involving 
fraud, malice, or insult. However, 
the case before it was distinguished 
as a lawsuit brought under a spe-
cific statutory provision addressing 
termination of a contract, as op-
posed to an action sounding in 
tort. Further, the court noted that 
the superintendent had not alleged 
that the school board acted in bad 
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, obdu-
rately, or for oppressive reasons in 
seeking to terminate the contract. 
The court noted that neither the 
trial court nor the Court of Ap-
peals had held that the school 
board acted obdurately, so held 
the obdurate behavior exception to 
the American rule inapplicable, 
and reversed the judgment award-
ing attorneys' fees. 
See Carnegie Financial Corp. v 
Akron Nat. Bank 8c Trust Co. 
(1976, Summit Co) 49 Ohio App 
2d 321, 3 Ohio Ops 3d 387, 361 
NE2d 504, in which an award of 
attorneys' fees to the prevailing 
party was reversed because the rec-
ord showed no evidence that the 
losing party acted obdurately. The 
underlying suit concerned the pri-
rel. Kabatek v Stackhouse (1983) 6 
Ohio St 3d 55, 6 Ohio BR 73, 451 
NE2d 248, and State ex rel. Crockett v 
Robinson (1981) 67 Ohio St 2d 363. 
21 Ohio Ops 3d 228. 423 NE2d 1099. 
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ority of Hens on automobiles. The 
bank that financed the purchase of 
the automobiles was ordered by 
the trial court to pay damages and 
attorneys' fees to purchasers of the 
automobiles. Both holdings were 
reversed on appeal. Stating that 
attorneys' fees could be awarded 
only under a specific statutory pro-
vision or under the circumstances 
of bad faith or obduracy as stated 
by the court in Sorin v Board of 
Education (1976) 46 Ohio St 2d 
177, 75 Ohio Ops\2d 224. 347 
NE2d 527, above, the court held 
that because neither exception had 
been argued at the trial court or 
on appeal, attorneys' fees were not 
recoverable as damages. 
III. Obduracy in conduct of trial 
litigation 
§ 5. Prosecuting suit; baseless 
claim 
The courts in the cases following 
recognized the appropriateness of 
regard of attorneys' fees under the 
obduracy exception to sanction a 
plaintiff bringing a meritless suit,] 
holding that the exception pro-! 
vided a remedy (or a defendant! 
brought into baseless litigation. 1 
In holding that attorneys' feesl 
could not be awarded under the! 
obduracy exception for prelitiga-l 
tion conduct forming the basis of 
the lawsuit, the court in Kikkert v 
Krumm (1985, Ind) 474 NE2d 503, 
49 ALR4th 819 (for a fuller dis-
cussion of the facts underlying the 
lawsuit as evidence of obduracy, 
see $ 3), stated that an award of 
attorneys* fees toja prevailing party 
is'jn thejature of_a igmgdy-for^a 
^^paTtyjr fr f f i t tg^ 
tion. Tn^jfrate Supreme Court first 
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noted that attorneys' fees are not 
allowable in the absence of a stat-
ute or in the absence of some 
agreement or stipulation specifi-
cally authorizing such fees, and 
noted that the same rule applied in 
courts of law and courts of equity. 
However, the court recognized that 
other jurisdictions had carved out 
an exception to the general rule 
through the use of the court's eq-
uitable powers when a party acted 
in bad faith. Stating that the case 
represented the first time the court 
had considered the obdurate be-
havior exception to the American 
rule, the court defined the obdu-
rate behavior exception as a pro-
tective measure which operates to 
help preserve the integrity of the 
judicial process. An attorney's fee 4 
award made under the obdurate 1 
behavior exception, according to I 
the court, was punitive in nature 1 
and designed to reimburse a pre- 1 
vailing party who has been dragged I 
into baseless litigation and as a I 
consequence subjected tojgrej^jjtaJ 
thaTtheobdurate behavior excep- ' 
tion came into play only at the 
time a party files a knowingly base- j 
less claim or at the time a party / 
discovers that the claim is baseless I 
and fails to dismiss it. The court 
stated that conduct such as this) 
1
 w n u l d c o n s t i t u t e o fr fh ir^^hehavtr fr 
\ipuil klnal court s hndingthat the 
behavior was vexatious and oppres-
sive in the extreme and a "blatant 
abuse of the judicial process." De-
scribing the underlying^awsuji^as 
arL^Kample of the^Tassic^^perty^ 
Qspujjxyand stating its belief that 
thlrTrtauuifTs and defendants dis-
puted aftlegitimjW claim of right, 
the court found tn4 obdurate be-
havior exception, as\a remedy for 
Af*' 
if 
defendants who are dragged into 
baseless litigation, inapplicable. 
The court in Dotlich v Dotlich 
(1985, Ind App) 475 NE2d 331, 
held that the obdurate behavior 
exception to the American rule 
against shifting of attorneys' fees 
provided a remedy for defendants 
dragged into baseless litigation, 
but was not available to a corpora-
tion that essentially prosecuted an 
action.- Relying upon Kikkert v 
Krumm (1985. Ind) 474 NE2d 503, 
above, for the proposition that the 
exception provides a remedy for a 
defendant dragged into_Jaaseless 
klitijpiMnr, the court recognized that 
I the exception could be utilized to 
I award fees to a defendant under 
I appropriate circumstances, though 
it was not available to award attor-
I neys' fees to a party that prose-
\cuted an action. 
OBDURACY: STATE FEE AWARDS 
49 ALR4ih 825 
§5 
A n a c t i o n forjal^»-tty |pp^nnpp>nf 
filed against a state judge which 
was found by the trial court to be 
"frivolous, unreasonable and 
groundless" provided a proper ba-
sis for an award of attorneys' fees 
under the obdurate behavior ex-
ception, according to the court in 
Owen v Vaughn (1985, Ind App) 
479 NE2d 83. The plaintiff was 
jailed for contempt by the judge, 
and later sued the judge for false 
imprisonment. The trial court en-
tered summary judgment for the 
judge and awarded attorneys' fees 
against the plaintiffs attorneys un-
der the provisions of a state tort 
claims statute. The award of attor-
neys' fees was later amended to 
make both the plaintiff and his 
attorneys liable for the fees under 
the judgment. After holding that 
the trial court had the discretion to 
award attorneys' fees against both 
the plaintiff and his attorneys, the 
court noted that as a general rule, 
attorneys' fees were not awarded 
within the jurisdiction in the ab-
sence of a contractual agreement 
or statute. The court stated, how-
ever, that exceptions to this rule 
had been carved out in recent 
years, one of which was the obdu-
rate behavior exception. This ex-
ception was defined as operable in 
situations in which the prevailing 
party has been dragged into base-
less litigation by the bad faith of 
Ithe losing party. Though holding 
'that the state tort claims act pro-
vided a proper basis for the award 
of attorneys' fees in the case before 
it, the court stated that even if the 
statute did not apply, the obdurate 
behavior exception would. Because 
tfiejtrial^otmjn^dea 
ing that IKe^pjajr^^ 




tne court "helcT thaT an award of 
attorneys' fees under the obdurate 
behavior exception would be 
proper. The judgment was af-
firmed. 
• 
Based upon the particular facts 
of the following cases, the courts 
determined that an award of attor-
neys' fees could not be recovered 
under the theory that the opposing 
party prosecuted the lawsuit based 
upon meritless or groundless 
claims. 
22. For the court's discussion of a fuller discussion of the underlying 
preliiigation conduct as obduracy and facts, see 9 3. 
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